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A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE 5th MARINES



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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 5TH MARINES

by

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


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

PREFACE

"A Brief History of the 5th Marines" is a concise narrative of the activities of that regiment since its initial organization over a half-century ago. Official records and appropriate historical works were used in compiling this chronicle, published for the information of those interested in the events in which the 5th Marines participated.

Acknowledgement is made to the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, for permission to reproduce the map appearing on the inside front cover.


R. G. OWENS, JR.
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Reviewed and approved: 9 April 1968

**MAJOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
A. E. F.**

LEGEND

YPRES-LYS
19 AUG - 11 NOV 1918

SOMME
8 AUG - 11 NOV 1918


AISNE-MARNE
18 JULY - 6 AUG 1918

OISE-AISNE
18 AUG - 11 NOV 1918

ST-MIHEL
12 - 16 SEPT 1918

MEUSE-ARGONNE
26 SEPT - 11 NOV 1918

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The Beginning

In the second decade of the 20th Century, United States foreign policy, especially the Monroe Doctrine, was undergoing severe tests in several Caribbean countries. President Wilson had warned foreign powers against intervention in the internal affairs of these troubled nations, and also had advised that we would recognize no head of state who had achieved his status without benefit of constitutional process. In 1913, a revolutionary coup that overthrew the elected government of Mexico ushered in a period of political instability that was matched in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. By the middle of the following year, conditions had not improved, so President Wilson ordered American military forces, including Marines, into these countries to help restore law and order.(1)

To help meet the need for additional Marine units, the 5th Regiment was formed. On 13 July 1914, at Vera Cruz, Mexico, three companies--the 44th Expeditionary, and the 45th and 46th of the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Force, Special Service Squadron--and a headquarters (Field and Staff) were organized under Major Carl Gamborg-Andresen, as the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment.(2) On that day, the battalion embarked on the transport USS Hancock for movement to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which it reached on 19 July.

During the latter half of July, Field and Staff, 5th Regiment and the 2d Battalion were activated at Norfolk. This battalion was composed of the 37th Company, recently returned to the States after a tour of China duty, and the 47th and 48th Companies made up of Marines from East Coast duty stations.(3) On 30 July, the Norfolk-formed portion of the regiment sailed for Guantanamo on the Hancock.

On 4 August, the Norfolk contingent landed at Guantanamo, and eight days later the regiment, commanded by Colonel Charles A. Doyen, reembarked on the transport to fulfill its first mission as a stand-by force in Dominican waters.(4) Until the latter part of October, the regiment moved to points of unrest along the republic's coast. Gradually, the Dominican government became less faltering and promised to remain stable.

In Haiti, however, financial difficulties caused by rebel actions shook the administration. The 5th, immediately dispatched to Port-au-Prince, arrived there on 31 October. When the situation improved, the regiment, still embarked, departed for its Cuban base. On 23 November, the 5th reembarked and touched at several Caribbean ports during the next three weeks. By then, the United States considered the political situation in the troubled countries sufficiently improved to order the Hancock north to Philadelphia.

After disembarking at the navy yard, the regiment was disbanded on 24 December 1914.(5) Two companies, the 37th and 45th, were detached to East Coast stations. All other units were dissolved, and the Marines thereof were returned to their former duty stations insofar as it was practicable.(6) Although the 5th Regiment no longer existed, its name had been established in a part of the Western Hemisphere, and soon the regiment's reputation would be known throughout a large portion of the world.

World War I

Officially, the United States entered World War I on 6 April 1917. Late in May, President Wilson directed the Secretary of the Navy "to issue the necessary orders detaching for service with the Army a force of Marines to be known as the Fifth Regiment of Marines...."(7), and, within 16 days, the regiment, completely organized and ready for active service, was sailing for France.

The rapid organization, equipping, and embarkation of this force was the product of considerable forethought. Major General Commandant George Barnett had strongly contended that Marines should be sent to Europe's Western Front. Accordingly, he conducted liaison with various War Department agencies to collect the information necessary to organize and equip a Marine expeditionary force. General Barnett's efforts began to bear fruit when, on 16 May, the Secretary of War asked President Wilson for a Marine regiment, equipped as infantry, for duty in France.(8) Anticipating approval, General Barnett recalled overseas troops, and organized them into battalions of the 5th Regiment. By 25 May, the 1st Battalion was organized at Quantico, and eight companies from the West Indies area were en route to Philadelphia to form the 2d and 3d Battalions.

The 1st Battalion was composed of the 15th Company from Pensacola and the 49th, 66th, and 67th Companies from the Norfolk area.(9) The 23d Company, recalled from Haiti, and the 43d, 51st, and 55th Companies returned from Cuba, constituted the 2d Battalion after debarking at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 30 May.(10) On the same date, the 16th Company from Haiti and the 8th, 45th, and 47th Companies from the Dominican Republic

arrived at Philadelphia to form the 3d Battalion. A liberal sprinkling of recruits was necessary to bring the companies up to the 200-man level of enlisted strength.

A familiar name appeared at the top of the regimental listing, for on 7 June Colonel Doyen again assumed command. Other headquarters personnel were assembled at the navy yard in Philadelphia. Recruits made up about 95 percent of Headquarters Company. Supply Company and regimental Field and Staff were formed by drawing upon various posts and stations from the East Coast, with a fairly large percentage of recruits being included.

Embarkation of the regiment began on 8 June 1917, when the headquarters organizations boarded the Hancock. (11) On this date, the 1st Battalion arrived in Philadelphia from Quantico and embarked on the USS DeKalb three days later. The band and the 2d and 3d Battalions moved by rail and ship to New York, where on the 13th, they embarked on the USS Henderson. Colonel Doyen, with staff and selected headquarters personnel, transferred from the Hancock to the Henderson on the 14th. Shortly thereafter, the Henderson and DeKalb departed for France. The venerable Hancock, with the remaining Marines of the regimental Headquarters and Service Companies, was obliged to wait until a slower moving convoy stood out of New York Harbor for St. Nazaire, France. (12)

En route to France, Marines were kept busy with compulsory shipboard drills; guard mount; inspections of men, equipment, and living spaces; target practice; maintenance of clothing and equipment; and duties as ships' lookouts and gun crew members. As if in return for the Marines' services, the Navy innoculated the regiment.

The voyage across the Atlantic was accomplished without loss of life from enemy causes. The 1st Battalion on DeKalb arrived at St. Nazaire in western France on 26 June. On the following day, the Henderson, with the 2d and 3d Battalions and Colonel Doyen and staff, moored alongside the DeKalb. The late-starting Hancock put into port on 2 July. By the 3d, the entire regiment was together in camp southeast of the city. (13)

President Wilson had directed that the 5th was to serve as part of an Army force, so the regiment was assigned to the 1st Division. Service as a part of this division consisted of training for most of the regiment, but included providing units for Lines of Communication (Service of Supply) duty. (14) Until mid-February 1918, about one-third of the regiment was on detached duty not involving combat training.

On 15 July, the regiment, minus those detached duty units, moved to the vicinity of Gondrecourt, an area in eastern France to the rear of the proposed American sector, for its initial training as a part of the 1st Division. On the 21st, units of

6th Groupe de Chasseurs Alpins, considered by the French to be among the finest units in their Army, were assigned as instructors for the regiment. Instruction was centered around the various phases of offensive and defensive trench warfare, including trench construction, grenade throwing, bayonet fighting, gas mask drill, weapons firing at land targets and airplanes, and artillery and artillery-infantry demonstrations.(15) The regiment retained responsibility for training in physical fitness, sanitation, close order drill, and small arms range firing. During this first period of training, many military dignitaries visited the regimental area. These included General Pershing, Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF); the 1st Division commander; and General Petain, the Commander in Chief of all French Forces. Just prior to the close of the training at Gondrecourt, units of the French 151st Infantry took over as instructors for the regiment.

In September, the 5th was reassigned to serve with the 2d Division(16) and moved south 22 miles (35 kilometers, 1 kilometer=5/8 mile) to Bourmont. In October, the regiment became part of the 4th Brigade of Marines, one of the two infantry brigades in the 2d Division.(17) In December, regimental maneuvers were conducted after the battalions had been trained in the relief of units in trenches and had held joint maneuvers with French troops.

By mid-November 1917, the Marine Brigade's 6th Regiment (less the 2d Battalion) had reached France. These battalions performed Lines of Communication duty until January 1918, when the regiment moved to the 2d Division area. Here, both the 5th and 6th trained, first with battalion, then regimental exercises. After the 2d Battalion of the 6th arrived in mid-February, the Marine brigade commander was able to exercise his force as a tactical unit for the first time. On 8 March, the last brigade maneuver took place, for upon its completion, the 2d Division was ordered to the front. Before leaving, however, the 4th Brigade adjusted its organization to bring the 6th Machine Gun Battalion up to its four gun-company strength.(18)

During mid-March the 4th Brigade departed Bourmont for the frontline trenches in the quiet Toulon Sector (see map, inside front cover) just southeast of Verdun.(19) Initially the 5th Regiment occupied the trenches centered around Les Esparges, 12 miles southeast of Verdun, and the 6th, those around Bonchamp, immediately to the left (north). In these areas Marines put to use against a live enemy the lessons they had learned in the training areas against a simulated or an imaginary foe. The procedure each regiment used was to have one battalion enter the trenches, opposite the German lines, remain for a specified time, then take relief from one of the two reserve battalions. Reserve troops, meanwhile, kept busy improving and repairing existing trenches and dugouts, digging new trenches, and stringing and repairing barbed wire entanglements. On the night of

19-20 April 1918, after the 5th had moved into the Bonchamp line, the enemy launched a raid during a battalion relief, but a determined effort by the 45th Company (3d Battalion) forced the Germans to retire.(20) This engagement was the regiment's first close contact with the enemy, and the outcome served notice that the Marines had learned their lessons well.

The 5th departed the Toulon Sector in mid-May, and proceeded to the Gisors training area, 38 miles northwest of Paris. Here, the regiment engaged in 10 days of open warfare training under the most satisfying conditions--the terrain was adequate, the surroundings beautiful, the weather enjoyable, liberty available, and spirits high. This, then, was the setting in the regiment, when suddenly on 30 May, the 2d Division, assigned to the French XXI Corps, French Sixth Army, received orders for movement eastward to stem the flow of onrushing Germans, whose surprise advance from the heretofore quiet Reims Sector threatened the very heart of Paris.(21)

Retreating Allied soldiers and fleeing civilians choked the suburban Paris roads on which the 5th motored.(22) After reaching Meaux, 25 miles northeast of Paris, the regiment continued the move by foot. Marching was made most difficult by the heavy loads on the backs of the Marines, the long grades over the dusty roads, the intolerably hot weather, and the sight of the physically tired and visibly dejected French soldiers who were in general retreat. When one French officer ordered a Marine officer to join the retreat, legend has it that Captain Lloyd W. Williams, of the 51st Company, 2d Battalion(23) startled the Frenchmen with, "Retreat hell, we just got here."

On 2 June, the 5th's battalions occupied reserve and forward positions, north of the Marne River and west of Chateau-Thierry, to assist the 2d Division in organizing the XXI Corps line and in covering the withdrawal of French units still engaged. By the 4th, the last of the withdrawing elements had passed through the Marine lines. During that day the 2d Battalion of the 5th repulsed by accurate rifle fire two enemy attempts to pursue the French through the battalion's positions. It appeared that these setbacks handed the Germans caused them to halt their advance, for they then began to redeploy troops for defense.

The Sixth Army ordered the XXI Corps to make two attacks on 6 June. The first, in which the 5th's 2d Battalion took part, was successful in straightening the corps front. The second was planned to reduce the German salient into the left of the 2d Division. Since the Marines held this portion of the line, the division ordered the 4th Brigade to execute that mission. The designated objective, known at that time as Bois de Belleau (Belleau Wood, probably named for the town of Belleau, just to the north) was to involve the Marines in one of their most famous fights.

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There were several reasons why the Battle of Belleau Wood was significant. As a defensive position, the objective was a natural--tall hardwoods, erupting from heavy underbrush and secondary growth, grew abundantly; a deep ravine cut the southern portion of the wood; throughout Belleau wound a great variety of contours in the form of sharply-rising knolls, jagged boulders, and huge stones, adorned with moss; the relatively open terrain over which the 5th had to advance to get into the wood afforded the Marines little concealment, while giving the defenders excellent observation. Maps of the area were inaccurate and incomplete. French intelligence had advised that the Marines' objective was lightly held, but they were wrong. The 461st Infantry Regiment, 1,169 strong, with orders to hold at all costs, garrisoned the bastion. In addition, the enemy had devised an effective, protective artillery barrage to support his ground defense, which contained hundreds of mutually-supporting automatic weapons positions, cleverly concealed in trees, behind rocks and piles of freshly-cut wood, and in the numerous depressions throughout Belleau.

Fighting for Belleau Wood began at 1700 on 6 June 1918, when the 3d Battalions of the 5th and 6th Regiments attacked simultaneously, each in four successive skirmish lines. The enemy greeted Major Benjamin S. Berry's 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment advancing over the open ground west of the wood, with heavy fire from hidden positions. A few of his Marines actually reached the wood's edge but had to be withdrawn before dark. The Sixth's 3d Battalion secured a foothold in the southern portion of the objective and took the nearby town of Bouresches. The 2d Battalion made the next major 5th Regiment attack on Belleau Wood. During the period 11-15 June, the battalion secured the northwest corner of the wood and withstood infantry, artillery, and gas attacks. The Marines had been compelled to bayonet the enemy in many of his positions in the wood, so tenacious and well-constructed was his defense. A large detachment from regimental headquarters contributed significantly to the success of this attack and defense.

The 7th Infantry Regiment began to relieve the 5th Regiment in the lines on 16 June. While out of the front lines, the 5th received personnel and equipment replacements, and by the 21st was ready to continue the mission of securing the objective. During the 5th's absence from the front, the 7th Infantry had made some progress in the wood against the Germans, who had replaced the remaining original defenders with elements of the 87th Infantry Division.

On 23 June, the 3d Battalion attacked to complete the capture of the northern portion of Belleau, the only part then in enemy hands. After a slight advance, the Marines ran into heavy machine gun fire and the protective artillery barrage. Unable to dig into the rocky ground, and taking heavy casualties, the battalion returned to its lines. Two days later, with the same

tactical plan, but with an increased amount of artillery preparation, Major M. E. Shearer's group struck out again. This time, it took less than five hours to drive the enemy from the objective.

In taking about half of Belleau Wood, the 5th Regiment suffered almost 2,000 killed and wounded, but it played a major role in initiating a German retreat that was to continue until the war ended. Meaux was saved from almost certain capture and the threat to the capital city itself was wiped out. In recognition of the magnificent fighting by the entire Marine Brigade in Belleau Wood, the French Sixth Army ordered that in future official correspondence (including maps) the famous wood would bear the name, Bois de la Brigade de Marine. Additionally, the brigade received a French Army citation for its gallant fighting.

Early in July, the 2d Division proceeded to a support area behind the Chateau-Thierry lines. After 11 days, the division, assigned to the French XX Corps, Tenth Army, motored and marched generally west, then north, to the huge Forest of Villers-Cotterets, to take part in the offensive against Soissons by cutting, at Vierzy, the only rail line within the enemy's Marne River salient.

This time the battlefield in front of the 5th was fairly open country, dotted with strongly built farms, an occasional village or quarry, and several ravines. Waist-high wheat fields abounded in the attack zone. En route to its attack positions, midway between the towns of Villers-Cotterets and Soissons, the regiment met with considerable misfortune. The movement to the line of departure was delayed by muddy roads. The night of 17-18 July was so dark that each man had to hold on to the Marine in front of him. The 5th was the last of the attacking regiments to arrive at the line of departure, and the rear units of the two assault battalions had to double time to get into position for the attack. Early on the 18th, however, the regiment, with the 3d Battalion in support, moved out eastward from the northeastern edge of the forest. On the 5th's right was the 3d Brigade, and on the left was the French 1st Moroccan Division.

Initially, the advance was vigorously opposed by the enemy, and close-in fighting was required to maintain the attack. Some of the Germans had taken up sniping positions in trees, but the sharp-shooting Marines effectively dealt with this enemy attempt to disrupt the attack. When the advance had cleared the woods, tanks joined the attack and progress became rapid. After the initial objectives were taken, the attack was to veer to the right about 45 degrees, or to a southeasterly direction. Some elements of both the 1st and 2d Battalions failed to make the change. The 17th Company on the regimental left continued to move eastward and helped the Moroccans seize the town of Chaudun, about six miles southwest of Soissons. Three of the 2d Battalion's

companies, turning too sharply to the right, joined units of the 3d Brigade in cleaning up Vauxcastille, two miles below Chaudun. Because the 1st and 2d Battalions became so widely separated, it was necessary to reinforce each of them with elements of the reserve battalion.

At 1330 the division issued orders for a second attack, to be made by the infantry (3d) brigade, supported by the 5th Regiment. The 3d Brigade commander attached the 1st Battalion, augmented by those previously-attached elements of the 3d Battalion, to the 23d Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, to the 9th Infantry operating in the division left. What remained of the 3d Battalion was placed in brigade reserve. Difficulties in reorganizing for the attack delayed its start until 1900. Shortly thereafter, the 23d, with the Marines' help, took the strongly-held town of Vierzy, just east of Vauxcastille.

Attacking on the division left, the 9th ran into heavy fire from the right. After that trouble was eliminated the attack continued for about another mile when the 5th's 2d Battalion was hit by enfilading fire from the left. While the battalion was removing the source of the delay, a group of tanks, which had preceded the attack, withdrew through the Marines' line, bringing along the intense artillery fire that had caused the vehicles to reverse direction. Despite the added casualties from the inopportune enemy artillery, the battalion held on, then, after the tanks were out of the area, wiped out the enemy on the left and moved forward with the 9th a short distance to an old trench line. Here the weakened battalions halted for the day. The following day the 6th Regiment took up the division attack and gained about a mile, while withstanding two counterattacks and forcing the Germans to withdraw. A French division relieved the 2d on 20 July.

The valiant fighting by the 2d Division at Soissons aided in forcing the Germans to begin a general withdrawal. On 29 July the division, reassigned to the French Eighth Army, began moving to the vicinity of Nancy, about 175 miles east of Paris, for replenishment, rest, and reorganization. While the regiment was there, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, reviewed the 3d Battalion on 5 August. Later that day, the 2d Division set out for the Marbache Sector, immediately northwest of Nancy.

Within this quiet sector, the 5th manned positions around Pont-a-Mousson. The only action occurred in the area of the 2d Battalion on 8 August at about 0200, when a small German party, apparently on a wire destruction mission, approached the lines, only to be driven off by machine gun fire and an artillery barrage. Thereafter, the sector remained quiet, and training, emphasizing target practice, advance under artillery fire, and attack on machine gun nests, consumed the Marines' time. By 19 August, the division was on the road to another training area,

about 12 miles southeast of Toul and east of the area about Gondrecourt where the 5th Regiment had first trained. In this new area, the 2d Division participated in an intensive training program in preparation for the St. Mihiel campaign. On 1 September the division departed on foot for the front.

For this campaign the 2d Division, commanded since late July by Brigadier General John A. Lejeune, USMC, became part of the American I Corps, American First Army. The division was to reduce a portion of the huge St. Mihiel salient and set up a defensive line from which a subsequent gigantic blow to crush the rapidly retreating Germans could be delivered. In front of the advance lay gently rolling terrain dotted with wooded areas. Initially, the Marine regiments would support the Army regiments' attacks, set for 0500 on 12 September.

On 10 and 11 September, the 5th Regiment, moving generally north, occupied the Limey Sector trenches east of Fleury. From these positions, the 5th moved forward, following the 9th Infantry attacking north in the right of the division zone. By midnight of the second day, the 5th had completed the relief of the frontline 9th, and on the next morning took up the attack. Resistance continued to be light until dusk when the enemy laid down a heavy artillery barrage, and followed this with an infantry rush. The charge was repulsed mainly by accurate rifle fire. Until its relief on the 16th, the 5th Regiment sent out strong patrols and gradually pushed the line forward into close contact with the Germans.

Units of the 5th Regiment did not play a major role in the St. Mihiel operation. There were, however, several noteworthy displays of combat excellence. Chief among these was the continued superiority in shooting. The stopping of the 14 September counterattack was due to the outstanding ability of the Marines to shoot accurately. The 2d Battalion brought down one airplane by rifle fire, and the 1st Battalion scored a direct hit on an enemy pillbox one mile away with a 37mm gun. In the St. Mihiel operation, the regiment sustained a loss of 136 casualties, including 23 killed.

Next, the division moved south again, to an area immediately southwest of Toul. Here, it trained until 25 September, when it entrained for Chalons-sur-Marne, halfway back to Meaux. From Chalons, north to the front, the division marched at night only, in order to escape enemy detection.

For the Marines in General Lejeune's 2d Division, participation in World War I's final campaign, Meuse-Argonne, was to include three separate actions--the Battle of Blanc Mont, occupation of a reserve sector at Leffincourt, and the fighting that led to the crossing of the Meuse River. Of these actions, the first was the most violent. In this battle, the French Fourth Army purposely placed its best division, the American 2d, opposite

the most difficult objective, Blanc Mont Ridge. The division was ordered to drive the enemy from his ridge fortress so that the stalled Meuse-Argonne offensive, which had started on 26 September, could be resumed.

The 200-foot high Blanc Mont Ridge, backbone of the German sector in the division's zone, stood above the other steep-sloped, round-topped hills that characterized this area, almost 20 miles east of Reims. Several years of artillery shelling had obliterated vegetation in many places, exposing the chalky white limestone beneath. The Germans had occupied the sector for almost four years and had taken pains to make the area a defensive masterpiece. Dugouts in Blanc Mont housed the command personnel for the sector. To complete the fortification, the Germans had constructed an intricate maze of trenches and concrete emplacements, and had strung tangled masses of barbed wire about them for protection against infantry attacks.

The division advance against Blanc Mont began from positions two miles to the south of that objective on 3 October. The Marine Brigade with the 5th Regiment in support, was on the left. At first, there was little opposition to the advance of the 6th Regiment, but as it approached the base of Blanc Mont, the 6th received flanking fire from the left. There, in the area of the French 21st Division, successive attacks had failed to oust the Germans from a curved portion, called Essen Hook, of an old trench. From concrete emplacements in the Hook, the Germans raked the 6th with enfilade machine gun fire. The 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, received the mission of silencing these weapons. After a brief but bitter fight, the 17th Company occupied the Hook and turned it over to the French.

On 4 October, after deployment during heavy enemy shelling, the 3d Battalion of the 5th led the 4th Brigade advance. About noon the battalion reached the edge of woods just southeast of St. Etienne, and about 2,400 yards north of Blanc Mont. From heights to the front, the enemy rained fires upon the battalion. On the right, the slower progress of the 9th Infantry exposed that flank, and on the left, the French had not yet come abreast, so the regiment was ordered to dig in for the night. Before dark, gains by the 9th Infantry closed the gap on the right, but on the left, at 2000, the Germans launched a counterattack into the rear of the 3d Battalion. Only after an extremely bitter fight did the enemy retire. The day had been one of the most bloody in the history of the 5th Regiment.

After relief late on 4 October by the 6th Regiment, the 5th reverted to the brigade support role and saw little more action in this area. The regiment marched rearward, first to Blanc Mont Ridge, and then on 9 October, after relief by elements of the U. S. 36th Infantry Division, farther south to an area around Souain, about 15 miles from the front lines. Here the 5th rested and refitted until 14 October, when it marched south with the

division to the vicinity of Chalons-sur-Marne.

On 19 October, the Marine Brigade was detached from the 2d Division and made available to the French IX Corps in order to relieve its 73d Division near Attigny. The next day, the Marines set out for that part of the front. Just northeast of Blanc Mont, at Leffincourt, however, the brigade received orders to revert to its division, which had been selected to spearhead the American First Army advance, a drive aimed at breaking through the opposing Fifth Army and forcing it to flee across the Meuse River. In turn, the division marked the 5th for the center attacking regiment.

From positions six miles southeast of Buzancy, the Marine Brigade, and 23d Infantry (on the right) moved out in the attack early on 1 November 1918. Throughout the day, resistance remained light, and each of the 5th's battalions had a hand in the successful advance. On 2 and 3 November, the 5th Regiment (minus the 2d Battalion, attached to the 9th Infantry) was in support of the 3d Brigade. On 4 November, the 5th returned to the lines and sent out strong reconnaissance patrols to the Meuse. During the next four days, the regiment continued to move forward in the right of the division zone. Plans were made to cross the river on the night of 9-10 November, but were postponed because of the difficulty in obtaining bridge-building materials.

The 2d Division had been ordered to cross the Meuse at two points, Mouzon on the left (north) and Letanne, five miles to the south. The 6th Regiment, with the 3d Battalion of the 5th attached, was to make the Mouzon crossing, while the remainder of the 5th Regiment, plus one battalion of the 89th Infantry Division, was to accomplish the Letanne movement. At Mouzon, attempts to gain the opposite bank on 10 November failed when the enemy discovered the site and brought all available fires upon it. The thrust at Letanne, however, did not share the same fate.

Beginning at 2130 on 10 November, the 2d Battalion started crossing the cold river. Despite heavy fire from German machine guns and artillery, treacherous footing on the board covered logs that served as floating bridges, and the uncertainty in the dark of night, the battalion crossed in one hour. Casualties and the scattering of units brought about by the difficulties in the crossing cut the battalion fighting strength to about 100 Marines by early morning. It reorganized, nevertheless, and moved out to the northwest, removing any enemy that remained. These efforts by the 2d Battalion made the 1st Battalion's movement to the east bank less difficult. When both battalions were across, they joined forces in a sweep along the river towards Mouzon. At this time, word on the armistice reached the Marines.

Accounts of the reactions of Marines and Germans to the news of the armistice differed. Some said that both sides celebrated,

even together, while others stated that friend and foe alike received the report joyfully, but in silence. Regardless of sentiments, the 5th still had much work ahead of it; realizing that the cessation of hostilities might be temporary only, the men began organizing the ground for defense. Then, on 14 November, after being relieved, the regiment, moved south to Pouilly, on the Meuse opposite Letanne, to re-fit and re-equip for the last phase of its European activities.

The 2d Division, of which the Marine Brigade was still a part, was one of six American divisions immediately ordered to move into Germany for occupation duty. The March to the Rhine began before sun-up on 17 November, and the 5th had the honor of providing the advance guard for the division. The first phase of the movement--to the German border, approximately 60 miles away--was made in six marching days and one rest day. The route to the border took the regiment southeast through Montmedy, France, across Belgium, and into Luxembourg to its eastern border with Germany. Here, the regiment participated in a defensive alignment of the division until crossing into Germany the first day of December.

Marines had wondered how the defeated people of Germany would react to the occupation. Since the 5th's arrival at St. Nazaire, the French had been generous in welcoming the Marines. Later, after the 5th had helped to save Paris and had fought in some of the more memorable battles of the war, French gratitude seemed endless. As the Marines marched to the German border, the people of France greeted the heroes with open arms, turned over their homes to them, and erected arches of triumph in their honor. So it was natural that upon entering Germany the members of the regiment would take stock of the expressions of attitude of the defeated citizenry. At first, the Marines found the German people reserved--and possibly fearful of the victors--but by the end of the year, the anxiety and aloofness were replaced with a spirit of friendliness and cooperation by a vast majority.

The 5th Regiment crossed the River Rhine at Remagen on 13 December and, on the 16th, moved to permanent winter quarters in the Wied River Valley just to the southeast. Here, the regiment began its mission of occupation. This duty involved not only a military preparedness to counter and defeat any riotous or warlike action of the German people, but also, a civil "know-how" to supervise the local governments of the various towns in the regimental area.

Training, of course, constituted the most important event in the day's activities. Schools, range firing, maneuvers, and reviews prevailed. To take advantage of duty-free time, Marines of the 5th took part in educational programs and availed themselves of the opportunities for leave in the larger French cities or for tours along the Rhine. Continuous emphasis was placed upon the physical readiness of the troops.

In May 1919, the German representatives at the World War I peace conference at Versailles, France, refused to accept the Allied surrender terms. Later, when it appeared that increased friction might spark an uprising in Germany, the occupation forces put into effect their emergency plans. On 17 June, the 2d Division marched eastward, but halted on the 23d when the Germans indicated agreement to the terms. At this time, the 5th's positions around Hartenfels represented the deepest penetration into Germany ever made by a Marine unit.

Late in July 1919, the 2d Division left Germany to return, via Brest, France, to the United States, arriving in New York early in August. On the 8th, the division paraded up New York's Fifth Avenue before many dignitaries. Later, in Washington, D. C., President Woodrow Wilson reviewed the Marine Brigade. Then, on the 13th, the 5th Regiment was disbanded at Quantico. For a short time, there would be no history making by the 5th Regiment, but for years to come, Americans and Europeans would be talking and writing about the 5th Regiment's deeds of valor in the first of the world wars.

Interlude Between Wars

A third activation of the 5th Regiment took place less than one year after its World War I disbandment. Again the place of reorganization was Quantico; the date, 8 July 1920.(24) Units in the regiment at this time were Headquarters Company, and the 8th, 17th, and 49th Companies, with Colonel Frederic L. Bradman in command. During Colonel Bradman's tenure, the regiment underwent several organizational changes that reflected assignments at home and abroad. In May 1921, the regiment was returned to its World War I organization of three, four-company battalions and various headquarters units. In August, an additional battalion of three companies, drawn from the 1st and 3d battalions, was formed for expeditionary duty. The three-company battalions lasted only until the next month, however, when the expeditionary battalion returned to Quantico, and the regiment resumed its four-company, three-battalion structure.

During the latter half of 1921, the 5th Regiment responded to its country's call on two occasions. In August, a border dispute between Panama and Costa Rica was brewing, and the regiment sent its 3d Battalion (Expeditionary) to the area, where it remained aboard ship only four days before returning to Quantico. In November, a series of mail thefts prompted the government to use Marines for guarding the mails. The 5th provided many of the officers and men who performed this duty in a most creditable manner. Almost at once the robberies ceased, and the Marines returned to the regiment during the period of January-May 1922.

Highlights of the regimental training in the early 1920s were the maneuvers held at sites of Civil War actions. During

these training missions, the regiment participated in the re-enactment of the famous battles that had been fought close to Quantico. The first of these was at The Wilderness, in Virginia, during the autumn of 1921. The following summer, the regiment marched to Gettysburg to present Pickett's Charge before a large crowd on 1 July. Three days later, the Marines presented a modern attack over the same ground. The third of the annual field exercises, held in 1923 in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, culminated in the production of the Battle of New Market. In 1924, the 5th took part in the restaging of the battle at Sharpsburg, Maryland.

The fame that the 5th Regiment had won during the World War brought with it a certain amount of responsibility to the public. Units of this famous fighting team were requested frequently for public appearances. Probably the most famous of these was Philadelphia's Sesquicentennial Exposition in 1926. But civic groups were not the only ones that bestowed such tributes upon the 5th. The Chief Executive usually was in attendance at the annual field maneuvers and on one occasion, prior to the Gettysburg reenactment, the regiment was reviewed on the White House grounds by the President--the first time this honor had been bestowed upon a military organization since the Civil War.

Ten years after its birth the regiment returned to the Caribbean area, this time to join in the United States Fleet maneuvers as part of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force. Other valuable foreign training took place at Guantanamo Bay, where, commencing in March 1926, battalions rotating from Quantico, engaged in an intensive program of some five months' duration. The cycle was interrupted during the 2d Battalion's tour when events in Nicaragua compelled the use of the entire regiment there. Just before the 5th's movement to Nicaragua, however, the Post Office Department once again requested Marines for protection of the U. S. mails. As in 1921, the robberies ceased once Marines were assigned as guards. The 5th Regiment supplied details for this duty throughout much of the East, in parts of the South, and as far west as Omaha.

In Nicaragua, a series of governments had failed to provide peace. Banditry seemed to be a major occupation for the forces opposing the government. To prevent injury to American lives and interests in Nicaragua, detachments of Marines and seamen had been landed on several occasions. Late in December 1926, the rise of bandit activity resulted in the death of an American, and increased destruction to our business interests. More Marines were requested, and in response, the 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, then at Guantanamo Bay, boarded ship and landed at Bluefields on the east coast on 10 January 1927, then moved via ship to the west when the major threat appeared in that region. In March, the remainder of the regiment landed at Corinto, on the west coast, and proceeded to Managua, the capital.



P. R. BREWER

Through the efforts of President Coolidge's personal representative, differences between the rebels and the government were settled temporarily on 4 May. By the terms of this parley, both parties, under Marine supervision would turn in weapons and ammunition. The Marines, then, would set up, train, and command a police force for the country. All confiscated property was to be returned promptly, and the Marines would remain until peace prevailed. An election would be held in November 1928, to determine the rulers desired by the people.

Most of the conference terms that were susceptible to immediate resolution were honored by both parties. The 5th Regiment supplied the six Marine officers who initially formed the Constabulary Detachment for operating Nicaragua's police force, the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. The 1st Battalion set up a defensive line to preclude a clash between opposing forces while the Nicaraguans surrendered their arms. Other regimental units were sent to cities and towns, at first along the principal transportation routes only, to maintain law and order until the Guardia could take over. Bandit raids became less frequent. Several small bands, and one large group of rebels headed by Augusto Sandino, refused, however, to turn in their weapons and ammunition. Sandino's bold actions, coupled with the fact that his following had increased, caused the regiment to extend its activities into the interior of Nicaragua.

Early in the summer of 1927, Marine forces in Nicaragua were reduced. The 11th Regiment, the other major organization of the 2d Marine Brigade (which had been established on 27 March) was ordered home, as was the 2d Battalion of the 5th. Fortunately, outlaw activity did not increase too much, although Sandino required considerable attention. In May, Captain Gilbert D. Hatfield, 3d Battalion, leading a large regimental patrol into the interior to capture Sandino, established a garrison at Ocotal in the northern wilds. Later, a Guardia company arrived. Then, on 16 July, with a much larger force, Sandino suddenly struck the post and demanded its surrender. When he received Captain Hatfield's terse, negative reply, the bandit chief launched several more assaults. Deadly rifle fire kept the rebels at bay, while overhead, Marine pilots, aided by ground signals, tore up the Sandino force with machine gun and dive-bombing attacks. The air-ground teamwork was too much for Sandino, and he retired after having taken heavy losses.

In September, members of the 1st and 3d Battalions engaged bandits east and southeast of Ocotal, at Quilali, and at Telpaneca. On 1 November, Marines of the 3d Battalion met the enemy near Quilali. The best-planned offensive in 1927 against the rebels began on 19 December. Patrols led by Captain Richard Livingston of the 3d Battalion and 1st Lieutenant Mertan A. Richal of Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, sought to destroy Sandino's fortress, believed to be at El Chipote north of Quilali. On 30 December, Captain Livingston's column was ambushed just

south of Quilali by a larger bandit force. The Marines re-tired while two airplanes strafed enemy withdrawal routes.

Lieutenant Richal's patrol met with little more success. On 1 January 1928, it encountered a sizable rebel force about six miles northwest of Quilali. The lieutenant was wounded, but Gunnery Sergeant Edward G. Brown was able to mount an attack against the enemy, who fled the commanding terrain. The patrol then awaited Marine-Guardia reinforcements while organizing the ground for defense. Aircraft pursued the bandits and later dropped supplies to the Marines. The reinforced patrol returned to Quilali without further incident.

In Quilali were 30 wounded Marines who needed care not available there. First Lieutenant Christian F. Schilt volunteered to fly out the casualties. In order to accommodate his plane, an O2U (Corsair, observation) Marines in Quilali constructed an airstrip by leveling walls to extend the length of existing dirt streets. On three days, beginning 6 January, Lieutenant Schilt made a total of 10 trips, evacuating 18 wounded and delivering 1,400 pounds of supplies and medicines. A unique aspect of those heroic flights was that the aircraft had no brakes. Marines helped stop the plane by grabbing the wings and dragging their feet.

Although these actions against Sandino did not result in his capture, they did cause him substantial losses of men, equipment, and supplies. In addition, before the end of January, Sandino lost his Chipote fortress after destructive Marine air and ground attacks. To add to the bandit's plight, most of the 11th Regiment had been returned on 15 January, and the 2d Battalion of the 5th, composed of Marine detachments from six battleships in Nicaraguan waters, was reactivated on 25 March. Faced with intensified operations, Sandino was forced to flee to the more primitive and remote area in the East.

To meet the threat there, the 5th Regiment's 51st Company was strengthened. Major Harold H. Utley, temporarily attached, was in command of the Bluefields area. His troops consisted primarily of the 51st, some men from the 11th Regiment, and occasionally, Marines from ship's detachments. Patrols moved quickly throughout much of the northeast of the country and used aircraft extensively and successfully. Sandino was forced on the defensive by these aggressive patrols. By August, he had lost his eastern base of operations, along with badly needed supplies and equipment, and many followers from battle casualties, capture, or cowardice.

Action in Central and Western Nicaragua continued during the middle of 1928, but the largest task confronting the regiment was the preparation for the national elections in November. As early as July, personnel in the 1st Battalion began receiving instructions in electoral duty. The next month, Marines from each battalion in the regiment attended schooling in election tasks.

Sandino's election policy consisted of a terror program to keep the natives from registering to vote. One of his chiefs was able to carry out a terrorist raid, but the result of the attack served only to increase the number of Marines assigned to protect those who desired to register. When election day, 4 November, arrived, a huge turnout by the people voted out the reigning party. Both parties admitted to an honest election, and the country settled down to a quiet life. It was so peaceful, in fact, that the 2d Battalion was again disbanded on 5 January 1929.

That month rebel activity resumed, but the capture of Jiron, one of the few chiefs who had remained loyal to Sandino, forced the bandit leader to depart Nicaragua on a fund-raising campaign. Since no competent leader was available to the rebels, they reduced operations to small raids designed to keep themselves alive.

The regiment began another period of reorganization in February 1929, when the nucleus of a new 2d Battalion was formed. Later, in August, the 43d and 77th Companies were added, with most of the personnel coming from the 11th Regiment. By May of 1930, the increase in the efficiency and operations of the Guardia and the decrease in rebel activity resulted in a further reduction of brigade forces and the reorganization of the regiment into an oversized 1st Battalion, consisting of the headquarters and the 17th, 23d, 44th, 51st, and 66th companies.

Nicaragua's relatively peaceful atmosphere in the middle of 1930 was shattered upon the return of Sandino. Until then, the Guardia effectively had contained the bandits, but in late 1930 and early 1931, the one-battalion 5th had to come to the Guardia's aid four times. Thereafter, the undersized regiment settled back to carrying out routine security missions for most of the remainder of its participation in the Second Nicaraguan Campaign.

Organizational changes continued to reduce the regiment. In April and May 1931, the 43d, 51st, and 66th Companies were disbanded. In June 1931, the 5th Regiment became the 5th Marines. At the same time, the designation of rifle companies was changed from numerical only to letter and numerical. This dual identity was to last until 1 January 1933, when the numerical reference was dropped.

Supervising the 1932 national elections proved to be the regiment's final Nicaraguan task. As in 1928, the Marines were instructed in expected duties well in advance, with the result that another honest and peaceful election ensued. After the president-elect assumed office on 1 January 1933, the regiment moved to Corinto and, on 3 January, disbanded there.

Within a period of six years, Marines in Nicaragua aided in the stabilization of the national government through the institution of sound electoral procedures and the establishment of a creditable agency to enforce the laws. While reaching these goals, the Marines protected the Nicaraguan business interests of America and other foreign nations. Banditry was not obliterated, for Sandino with his following was still loose in the country, but armed rebel activity was suppressed materially.

Most of these political achievements were wiped out in subsequent years, but what could not be taken away was the military experience gained in Nicaragua. In particular, the technique of using aircraft in support of ground operations was a most outstanding feat. In the few years ahead before the outbreak of World War II, Marines who had served in Nicaragua with the 5th were to be instrumental in improving upon and perfecting this air/ground teamwork which would become a trademark of Marine Corps success.

World War II

Marine Barracks, Quantico, was once more the scene of the reactivation of the regiment. On 1 September 1934, the 1st and 2d Battalions, Fleet Marine Force (FMF) became the 1st and 2d Battalions, 5th Marines, FMF. Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. B. Price assumed command of the regiment. One company was on temporary duty at the Century of Progress in Chicago when the 5th was re-formed. In November and December 1934, 3d and 4th Battalion Detachments were added to the regimental organization but remained only until the end of March 1935.

The year 1935 saw the beginning of an intensive six years of training for the regiment, which was a part of the 1st Marine Brigade during all but nine and one-half months of that period. Each year, the 5th participated in winter landing exercises, usually conducted at Culebra, as part of the U. S. Fleet. The 1937 winter exercise, however, took place off the California coast, and during this operation, the 5th and 6th Marines were together in the field for the first time since 1919.

Members of the 5th Marines took part in the annual national rifle matches at Camp Perry, Ohio. Battalions rotated duty there as support troops required in the conduct of a large scale, small arms competition. For additional training in the use of crew-served weapons, units of the regiment moved to Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, for combat firing practice during the summers of 1938-1940.

Again the 5th participated in celebrations of civil war battles fought close to Quantico. In 1935, it took part in the Chancellorsville Pageant, and in 1936 and 1937, the 5th Marines reenacted the First Battle of Manassas and the Battle of the Crater at Petersburg. Regimental encampments and maneuvers occurred at Camp Meade, Bristow, Virginia in 1936 and at Brentsville, Virginia in 1938. During many of the summer months of this period before World War II, the regiment supplied officers and men to assist in reserve training at Quantico.

From time to time, other training and assigned duties separated temporarily groups of Marines from the regiment. To promote skills in technical fields, specialists were sent away to schools. In 1936 and 1939, members of the regiment assisted in testing landing craft in Philadelphia and off the Virginia Capes. After the tragic burning of the German Zeppelin, Hindenburg, at Lakehurst, New Jersey in 1937, two of the 1st Battalion's companies stood guard over the blackened hulk for more than a month. The regiment furnished men for the Marine Detachment, New York World's Fair in 1939.

At the beginning of 1941, the 5th Marines was engaged in a series of training and landing exercises in the Caribbean. This training was highlighted by participation in Fleet Landing Exercise #7 in January and February. On the first day of the latter month the regiment joined the 1st Marine Division. As one of the division's infantry regiments, the 5th took part in combined Army, Navy, and Marine landing exercises off the East Coast in July and August. Then, in September, the regiment

moved to New River, North Carolina, its new home.


In January 1942, a month after the Japanese Pearl Harbor attack, the 1st Battalion was detached as a separate FMF battalion which later served as the nucleus of the 1st Raider Battalion. A new 1st Battalion, reconstituted from trained Marines within the regiment and recruits out of Parris Island, took the place of the old one. (In a similar manner, the 3d Battalion had been formed in April 1940.) A regimental Weapons Company was added to the 5th in April 1942.

The regiment boarded the transport Wakefield (the former SS Manhattan) and, on 20 May, began the longest voyage in its history to that date, a passage that would lead to four invasions of enemy-held territory. The 5th Marines was well prepared as a result of individual and specialist training, battalion and regimental exercises in beach landing and operations ashore, and advanced training in combined exercises to increase and perfect amphibious skill. This proficiency was to be combat-tested in less than two months after the regiment debarked at Wellington, New Zealand on 14 June.

By 19 June, the 5th had completed the 35 mile move north to the 1st Marine Division camp. The division expected to go into combat early in 1943, but on 26 June, it received information of employment within five weeks to seize the island of Guadalcanal.(25) Immediately, the regiment repacked, moved back to Wellington, reloaded, and by 2 July, reembarked, remaining aboard ship the next four weeks until the Guadalcanal rehearsal at the Fiji Islands during 28-30 July. On the 31st, the ships carrying Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift's 1st Marine Division set out for Guadalcanal.(26)

Largest of the British Solomon Islands and a recent Japanese acquisition in the Southwest Pacific, Guadalcanal lay about 10 degrees below the equator, about 1,000 miles east of the northern tip of Australia, and nearly 3,100 miles southwest of Hawaii. The airfield on Guadalcanal and the excellent harbor in neighboring Tulagi were the prime objectives of the forthcoming campaign. Perhaps more important was the strategic worth of Guadalcanal--one of a number of guardians for the vast Allied supply line from Hawaii to both Australia and New Zealand. In order to strengthen this line of communication, to stop the enemy advance, and at the same time, to obtain a base for mounting future operations against him, the attack on Guadalcanal was ordered.

The First Offensive **GUADALCANAL**



P. R. BREWER

The landing on Guadalcanal was to be made in conjunction with a two-battalion landing on Tulagi. The 1st Raider Battalion, followed ashore by the 5th's 2d Battalion, was to secure this island. On Guadalcanal, the 5th Marines (minus the 2d Battalion initially) would land its battalions abreast on the north coast, slightly less than five miles east of Lunga Point, over a section of beach (Beach Red) expected to be lightly defended. Afterwards, the regiment would be prepared to protect a portion of the beach and to advance overland to the west.

On Tulagi the assault landing by the raiders went as planned. By 0916 on 7 August 1942, the 2d Battalion, 5th, was ashore. During the first day's operations, it joined with the raiders in pushing toward the southern end of the island. On the following morning, Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion secured the southwestern part of the island and swung right to join in clearing an enemy pocket in a ravine. In the afternoon, the raiders, supported by the 2d Battalion's 81mm mortar fire and aided by its Company G, pushed through the cave-lined ravine and wiped out all organized resistance.

The Guadalcanal landing came off as planned also, with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines landing on the right and the 3d Battalion on the left over Beach Red, which the enemy chose not to defend. At 0938, regimental headquarters was ashore. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion had moved about 4,000 yards to the west and set up a defensive position at Alligator Creek, about 2,300 yards northeast of the center of the airfield, and the 3d Battalion had organized the southeastern part of the beach as a precaution against Japanese attacks. On the next day, the 1st Marines captured the airfield, and named it Henderson Field in honor of a Marine flyer killed in the Battle of Midway.

On 9 August, there took place an event that was instrumental in shaping General Vandegrift's tactics for the next several months. On that date, the American ships withdrew from Guadalcanal after suffering heavy losses; with those ships went a large amount of the Marines' supplies, a significant portion of the division's protection from Japanese naval and air attacks, the division's capability to thwart enemy reinforcement of Guadalcanal, and the Marines' hope for prompt and continued resupply. Aware of these unfavorable circumstances and realizing that, above all, he must hold the airfield (even though there were only five infantry battalions, plus an equivalent number in service and support troops on the island) General Vandegrift thought an all-out offensive tactically unsound. He, therefore,

ordered the division to establish a defensive perimeter, centered around the airfield and anchored on the eastern and western extremes of the defensive line running along the coast. Aggressive patrols would maintain contact with the enemy and gain intelligence about him, and timely limited offensives would keep the Japanese off balance.

By 12 August, the division had established the perimeter, with the 5th Marines manning about one-third of the area, on the division right (west) flank. On 19 August, the regiment, initiating the planned limited offensives with a three-pronged attack along the Matanikau River, forced the enemy to flee a village strongpoint. The attackers returned to the perimeter before dark. Eight days later, the 5th's 1st Battalion moved west by boat, landed behind the enemy, and attacked along the shore, back towards the perimeter. Again the results were inconclusive as the enemy slipped away during the night. The attackers returned to the perimeter on the 28th.

Early in September, the Tulagi landing force crossed over to Guadalcanal. Most of these Marines were put into positions along the perimeter on a 1,000 foot-long ridge south of the airfield. The 2d Battalion of the 5th, however, was placed in division reserve about a mile northwest of the field. The ridge had been chosen by the Japanese as a prime objective in a plan to recapture Henderson Field. During the period of 12-14 September, a recently-landed enemy brigade made several assaults upon the height. In the dark hours very early on the 14th, small groups penetrated the defenses and threatened the left flank. The 2d Battalion (division reserve) moved forward to bolster the sagging defenses and restore the lines. In a short time, the enemy was forced from the ridge into the jungle from which he had launched his assaults. Marine air attacks pursued the enemy and hampered his attempts to make the retreat orderly. Most of the brigade had been destroyed in the bloody Battle of the Ridge.

With the successful defense of a major position against a large enemy force and upon the arrival of the 7th Marines four days later, General Vandegrift ordered an increase in offensive actions to keep the Japanese off balance and to deny them the opportunity for launching another large-scale attack. One such offensive in which the 5th Marines took part was the 7-9 October attack along the Matanikau River. In this action, the 5th (less the 1st Battalion) moved a mile overland to the river and engaged the enemy there. Another group, meanwhile, crossed the river

farther inland (south) and turned north to hit the Japanese centered around Matanikau village, just southeast of Point Cruz.


While this action was in progress, it was learned that the Japanese were preparing to launch a main counteroffensive against the division. In order to strengthen the perimeter, the division commander ordered the entire force to return. Although the action was cut short, the damage inflicted upon the enemy was severe. The division's attack also interrupted Japanese plans to strike the Marines during the same period. Within two weeks, however, the forewarned attack took place. It, like the other attempts, was unsuccessful, and cost the enemy heavily.

Before the end of October, the division's strength had been reinforced sufficiently to permit offensives by larger forces. Accordingly, the division commander ordered a push west to destroy the enemy between the Matanikau River and the village of Kokumbona beyond, and to set up an advanced patrol base near that place. This advance was to be the last major action for the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal.

The attack, with the 5th leading, began early on 1 November and by nightfall the regiment had the enemy boxed in on two sides against the beach just west of the base of Point Cruz. The next morning, the 2d Battalion completed the fence around the Japanese. That afternoon, after heavy artillery preparation, the 3d Battalion attempted to compress the pocketed enemy force, but it held fast. Japanese defense of the pocket ended the afternoon of 3 November after two attacks by regimental units. The enemy suffered at least 300 killed and lost 47 crew-served weapons captured by the regiment. The 2d Marines (less its 3d Battalion) then relieved the 5th, which returned to the perimeter.

Back inside the perimeter, the regiment was losing its only battle on the island; malaria had produced more casualties than Japanese action had caused. The disease prevailed, in fact, throughout the 1st Marine Division. With additional combat troops now on the island, the division was ordered to the rear for rest and rebuilding. On 9 December 1942, the movement began with the sailing of the 5th Marines for Australia.

To the 5th, Australia was a paradise. The climate, for the most part, was agreeable, and its people were most friendly. The area around the division camp outside Melbourne, and the city itself, were as picturesque as Marines had seen.



Rehabilitation from the rigors of the Guadalcanal fighting and initial training for the next campaign went on concurrently. (27) As the physical condition of the Marines improved, the nature of the training became more intensive and demanding. Battalion landing team (BLT)(28) and regimental combat team (RCT) exercises with live ammunition and a series of field problems served to remind the regiment that another battle was close at hand. On 27 September, the 5th departed Australia for Milne Bay, New Guinea, for advanced training, emphasizing shore-to-shore operations and utilizing terrain closely resembling that on New Britain.

The new objective, a 350 mile-long island just northwest of the Solomons, contained on its northeastern tip the Japanese naval and air strongpoint, Rabaul. The 1st Marine Division, as a part of the ALAMO Force, was to occupy the western half of New Britain by taking the Cape Gloucester airdrome first, then advancing east to the approximate center of the island. Dominance of western New Britain would cut off Japanese traffic from the Solomon Sea and provide troop, air, and naval bases from which to launch attacks south against northern New Guinea and east against Rabaul. Early in the planning for the campaign, the ALAMO commander designated the 5th Marines to seize an area in south-central New Britain. Upon strong urging by the 1st Marine Division commander, Major General William H. Rupertus, the ALAMO Force head returned the regiment, but too late to make the assault landings on 26 December 1943.

As division reserve the 5th Marines (reinforced, but less its 3d Battalion)(29) landed on 29 December over Blue Beach, about four miles northwest of Silimati Point, and made preparations to assist the 1st Marines in capturing the excellent drome, defended by units of the 65th Brigade. By 1925 that day, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 2/5,(30) reached the center of No. 2 airstrip, and continuing the westward trek, overran the abandoned No. 1 strip on the 30th. Before the year 1943 ended, the regiment participated in expanding and defending the perimeter around the captured Gloucester trophy.

Brigadier General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Assistant Division Commander (ADC) had been assigned, on 29 December, the mission of clearing the enemy from the area around Borgen Bay, formed in the north by Silimati Point. Assault troops for this task were the 7th Marines plus 3/5. The ADC Group (as this particular organization within the division was called) faced a continual series of fights for key terrain objectives. The toughest,


**VOLUPAI - TALASEA
OPERATIONS**

6 - 11 MARCH 1944

5th MARINES ROUTE OF ADVANCE

APPROXIMATE FORM LINES SHOWN

MILES
KILOMETERS




R.F. STIBIL

perhaps, was the battle for Aogiri Ridge, a jungle-hidden rise heavily fortified by the Japanese and finally seized by 3/5.

Late on 9 January 1944, after a series of unsuccessful assaults had failed to dislodge the enemy from Aogiri, a dramatic incident sparked a successful advance. A 37mm gun, man-handled up to the front lines, began blasting a path through the jungle to the hill's crest. When the crew started dropping from enemy fire, 3/5's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt, put his shoulder to the wheel and, aided by a succession of volunteers, pushed the gun up the steep slope and into position to sweep the ridge. The rest of the battalion, and two 7th Marines companies, encouraged by the personal example of leadership and bravery, followed up the hill and organized their foothold on the ridge for defense. Early the next morning, the Japanese launched a counterattack, but it, like the four that followed, failed to dislodge the weary but enheartened Marines. Later in the morning, as 3/5 moved out, it discovered that Aogiri Ridge, renamed Walt's Ridge by order of the ADC, commanded the main Japanese supply route in the area.

While 3/5 mopped up Walt's Ridge, the rest of the group pursued the enemy until he put up another determined stand on Hill 660, some 2,300 yards to the southeast. The 7th captured that height on 14 January and defended it until relieved two days later by the 5th Marines. On the 16th, the 5th's commander, Colonel John T. Selden, assumed responsibility for the area and undertook the mission of locating and defeating the Japanese within his sector before the next phase of the New Britain operation began. During the remainder of January 1944, 5th Marines' patrols failed to locate any sizable Japanese force but frequently came upon evidence of recent occupation.

Captured enemy documents indicated the Japanese withdrawal route ran east to Iboki, on the north coast about halfway across western New Britain, so on 1 February, patrol activity for the 5th Marines shifted towards that place. Between its base near the Natoma River at the head of Borgen Bay, and the area of Iboki, about 45 miles east, the regiment sent out a series of patrols. The initial patrol was by land, but subsequent ones were by boat along the coast to a designated point, then by foot to the objective. Successive landings, in leapfrogging fashion, carried the entire regiment to Iboki by 27 February--the first time in the 1st Marine Division history that a regiment had made a lengthy shore-to-shore operation along an enemy-held coast. Noteworthy as they were, the excursions still had not



located the enemy. Documents captured later revealed that the Japanese had actually used the route east to Iboki, but that they were always a few days or miles ahead of the Marines. It was apparent that the elusive enemy had continued east at least to the Willaumez Peninsula. On 1 March 1944, division ordered the 5th Marines to seize and occupy the peninsula, the base of which lay 55 miles east of Iboki. The primary target, Talasea, on the eastern coast, was thought to be the hub of enemy withdrawal activity.

After an overnight run in a landing craft armada, escorted by motor torpedo boats, the regiment began landing near Volupai, midway up the western coast of the peninsula, just after 0830 on 6 March. Opposition from the small enemy group defending in the area was light. The landing force rapidly advanced inland, and by the end of the day, had penetrated approximately 2,000 yards. On the 7th, the advance in a general southeasterly direction, continued against light opposition. The following day, forward movement carried the regiment to the base of Mt. Schleuther, west of Talasea, and onto the airstrip at Talasea. Elements of the 1st and 2d Battalions captured Mt. Schleuther on 9 March, and the area was declared secure later that day.

From 10 March to 25 April, the regiment's battalions patrolled north, south, and southeast from the newly won area. No large enemy units were encountered, and in effect, the patrol action amounted to a mopping up of those unfortunates who had not escaped. This new location was a paradise of hot water springs, fishing, and swimming. Here, the regiment also conducted schools and training for personnel not assigned to patrols. During the last four weeks of this period, the 2d Battalion was located at Numundo and San Remo plantations along the coast south of Talasea.

April 25th was moving day again as the regiment boarded LCMs to return to Borgen Bay for further transport to a rest area. It was hoped that a return to Australia had been ordered. In a short time, the destination would be known.

The temporary home for the 1st Division was the small island of Pavuvu, in the Russells, 60 miles northeast of Guadalcanal. Pavuvu had nothing in common with Australia, and from the start, the desire of most of the men was to get off that "rain-soaked, rat-infested," rotten island.(31) Instead of participating in a gradual rehabilitation-training program, the 5th had to construct its bivouac area from scratch. Soon morale reached a low point,

for with all the work, there was little material for rebuilding the mental and physical strength of the Marines. Only the poorest, low-grade movies were available; food consisted mostly of rations similar to those consumed in the New Britain campaign, even though on nearby islands service troops were eating fresh provisions more frequently; visits to sick call became more numerous.

From a military view, the regiment found Pavuvu no better. It was too small even for battalion maneuvers; conditioning hikes had to be run over a small merry-go-round course. The island offered little in similarity to the locale for the next operation. Constructing camps and facilities, and policing the regimental area of coconuts that had fallen, accumulated, and rotted during the years since the start of the war, took up much of the training time.

Despite the inadequacies of the island, the 5th Marines grew more sound as its members solved a good many of the habitability problems. Improvising and resourcefulness on the part of others in the division added to the efficiency of training. And, upon embarkation for the Peleliu operation, the realization that Pavuvu was a thing of the past boosted morale.

Peleliu, at the bottom of a geographic semicircle formed by the Philippines to the northwest, and to the northeast by the rest of the Western Carolines and the more distant Marianas, was required for the protection and support of future operations against the Japanese-held Philippines. Low, flat, and shaped like a giant lobster's claw, the island target was six miles long and two miles wide. The geographic location of the island, at 7° North Latitude, could ensure the Marines of some more hot, humid, and rainy atmosphere.

The immediate military value of the island lay in its excellent airfield in the south. North of the field, on the longer claw, ran a ridge that appeared to be the best defensive terrain on Peleliu.(32) For the 15 September 1944 assault landings, the 5th Marines would land in the center of the 1st Marine Division beaches. The regiment then would seize the airfield and continue the attack to the northeast. The 1st Marines was scheduled to land on the left of the 5th, and the 7th, on the right. After rehearsals at Guadalcanal on 27 and 29 August, the division, as part of the III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC) re-embarked and, by 4 September, was underway for the objective, 1,600 miles to the northwest.

At 0830 on 15 September, the 5th Marines landed on south-western Peleliu's Orange 1 and 2 beaches against relatively light opposition, with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d on the right. The 2d Battalion began landing at 0935 and took up positions on the regimental right and, before the day was over, made a striking advance which swept the southern portion of the airfield and carried the battalion almost to the opposite shore. This rapid movement provided much needed terrain for the emplacement of division artillery. On the left, the 1st Battalion, with the aid of Marine tanks, 2/1, and some aircraft, repulsed the main Japanese tank-infantry counterattack of the day. The 3d Battalion's advance the first day cut the island in two.

During the first week of fighting, the 5th Marines made the most substantial ground gains on the island. On the 16th, the regiment turned northeast, cleared the airfield, and continued across the low ground. For two days, advances on the regimental left were hampered by fires from uncleared elevations to the west and north. On the right, however, the 2d Battalion made good progress against scattered ground resistance and light shellfire, and by the end of the period, had secured the eastern portion of Peleliu and the close-in islands. The 1st and 3d Battalions continued to alternate duty in the regimental left and reserve areas until 25 September when the 5th began action in the northern part of the island.

That day, the 5th Marines passed through the lines of RCT 321(33) and moving up the coast on the western side of the island, advanced to secure the enemy radio station near the tip of Peleliu. On the next day, the regiment shifted the direction of its effort to the east in order to seize numerous cave-infested hills. The taking of the hills was most difficult, for the enemy had utilized the terrain to good advantage. On 27 September, the advance was halted by perhaps the largest and most elaborate cave on Peleliu. To overcome this barrier, the regiment's plan--combining fires from ships, artillery, gun and flame tanks, and armored amphibian tractors (LVT(A)s (34) with ground assaults--when put to test later that day resulted in neutralization of the cave and eased the task of securing the northern portion of the island, completed on 30 September.

Late in the afternoon of 27 September, the 3d Battalion received word that it would land the next morning on Ngesebus Island, immediately west of Peleliu's northern tip. Support from ships, division artillery, tanks, and LVT(A)s and Marine

aircraft would prepare the island before the first wave of tractor-borne infantry landed. Numerous dignitaries were invited to view the operation.

Preliminary support proved to be excellent as little resistance from the prepared beach defenses greeted the landing force; neither did the battalion take any casualties while traversing the beach. Thereafter, the battalion, employing available supporting arms to the limit, moved inland, and by 1700, had taken all but a small portion of Ngesebus. It was declared secure the following day, and 3/5, upon relief by a battalion from RCT 321, returned to Peleliu. In the brief Ngesebus fight, 3/5 had accounted for 463 Japanese, while losing 28--a remarkably light proportion of losses for an attacking force.

For the 5th Marines, the final phase of action on Peleliu involved assistance in reduction of the Umurbrogol Pocket, north of the airfield. The Pocket was formed by a large number of small hills and ridges, irregular in shape, all with steep slopes, some with sheer sides, many jutting with sharp rock formations. Within these elevations were man-made and natural openings that served as defensive fortresses, many of which were mutually supporting. An attack against any one of the caves would bring enemy fires from numerous others.

Reduction of the Pocket had begun on 17 September when the 1st Marines, while advancing north, encountered the Umurbrogol bastion. The area was, therefore, an old battleground when, on 6 October, the 5th relieved the 7th Marines to reduce the defenses in the north central portion of the mountains. The restrictive nature of the terrain and the large number of compartments within the Pocket required the employment of small-size units to accomplish the mission. In the initial regimental attack, a Company G platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant Robert T. Wattie, succeeded in gaining a tactically important height, thereafter called Wattie Ridge, and later, another commanding feature, Baldy Ridge. On 11 October, units of 2/5 assaulted the strongly defended Hill 140, which commanded approaches to other major defensive positions within the Pocket. A double-pronged attack carried this rise by midafternoon. After withstanding a night counterattack, 2/5 was relieved by 3/5 the next day. Earlier (10 October) 1/5 had been relieved and had marched south to a bivouac area.

For the 5th Marines, the remaining action on Peleliu was



confined largely to straightening out the division salient, constricting the Pocket further, and improving defensive positions. By 16 October, all 5th Marines' units had been relieved from the front lines. Until the end of the month, the regiment occupied general reserve positions on Peleliu and on off-shore islands. On 30 October, the 5th departed Peleliu for another period of rehabilitation, and this time, it would return to a rear area where it had been before.

The place to which the division returned was Pavuvu, but as the Marines in the 5th landed, they noticed that it was a different Pavuvu.(35) Recently arrived replacements were swimming, facilities were greatly improved, and the camp area already was set up for occupancy. After the regiment was settled, its members were able to engage in a great variety of athletic contests, visit old buddies throughout the division area, or just relax. It was, indeed, a new Pavuvu, and most of the former residents soon forgot how terrible the old one had been--except when the young replacements were around.

Although much had been accomplished to make the island habitable, little could be done to increase Pavuvu's size in order to make it more suitable for training. One improvement, a drill field, did assist in increasing precision of movement, discipline, and pride, but the island was still too small for unit maneuvers. To offset this disadvantage, the regiment took its turn in a two week, combined arms training period on Guadalcanal just before the final rehearsal, also on Guadalcanal, for the next campaign on Okinawa. En route to the objective, the regiment spent some time ashore at Ulithi, an atoll about 450 miles northeast of Peleliu, to relax and to keep in physical condition. Then, on 26 March, the reembarked 5th moved out in the huge armada for its 1 April appointment.

Okinawa was a most desirable Allied objective; it possessed excellent air and naval facilities and was close to Japan--only 325 miles to the southern limits of Kyushu Island. Furthermore, capture of this large island would complete control of the seas off the Chinese mainland to the west and make possible command of the narrows guarding the southwest approaches to the enemy homeland. To accomplish the seizure of Okinawa, the Marines' IIIAC and the Army's XXIV Corps were made available to the Tenth Army. The 1st Marine Division was to land in the right of its corps' zone, assist the 6th Marine Division (landing on the 1st Division's left) in the capture of Yontan airfield, then drive rapidly to the east towards Katchin Peninsula, directly opposite

the west coast landing beaches at Hagushi. The 1st Division ordered the 5th Marines to land on the right, and the regiment placed 2/5 and 1/5 in the assault. To the latter fell the responsibility of maintaining contact with the XXIV Corps' left-most element.

The campaign on Okinawa promised to bring new experiences in World War II fighting to the 5th. For the first time, the regiment would land as part of a much larger force--in the initial beach assault alone there were 16 battalions landing simultaneously. Once ashore, the Marines would find the climate less severe and the terrain more open and cultivated than had been the case on the torrid coral and jungle islands previously assaulted. Despite the possibility of encountering the novel aspects of battle, there were, however, some familiar (and haunting) companions--torrential rains and grotesque terrain--awaiting the arrival of the regiment.

The assault landings on 1 April went as planned for the 5th Marines. By 0945, the regiment was 1,000 yards inland, still advancing against negligible resistance. At 1700, the regiment halted and dug in for the night. During the next three days, attacks by the 5th placed its front lines on the island's eastern coast along the shores of the Katchin Peninsula. Until the end of the month, the 5th Marines confined its activities to improving the road net, sealing Okinawan burial tombs, demolishing numerous caves, and patrolling to pick up Japanese stragglers. During this time, the rest of the division assisted the 6th Division in the central Okinawa fighting. Before the month ended, Tenth Army directed IIIAC to furnish one division to the army corps for its drive to the south. Accordingly, IIIAC designated the 1st Division. It took up positions on the XXIV corps' right, where Major General Pedro A. Del Valle placed the 1st Marines on the west flank (right) and the 5th on the left. When the Marines completed relief of the 27th Infantry Division on 1 May, they were in for some of the most bitter fighting in their history.

Immediately confronting the regiment was the task of consolidating its positions, about 2,000 yards south of Machinato, and reconnoitering the zone of advance before launching an attack on 2 May. That attack gained very little yardage as both 2/5 on the left and 3/5 were hit by heavy frontal and flanking fires. During the following nine days, the 5th fought hard to flush out Awacha Pocket, a Japanese stronghold built into a maze of cliff-like ridges and tangled gorges. The regiment was able to eliminate the resistance only after making repeated, determined attacks in

conjunction with excellent Marine air, artillery, tank, and naval gunfire support. On the ground, each of the battalions, usually working with gun and flame tanks, took part in the methodical assaults against the resolute enemy, who chose to be burned alive or sealed in caves rather than to be taken prisoner.

By the time (15 May) the 5th Marines returned to the lines, IIIAC had been ordered into the fighting in the south, with the 6th Division taking up the attack in the extreme right (west) of the Tenth Army front. Across the entire army line the rate of advance was generally uniform (as it was to be throughout most of the remainder of the campaign) with slightly greater gains on the left flank and in the zone of the 6th Division. The addition of that division on the right flank reduced the front of the 1st Division, but did, in no way, diminish the severity of the 5th Marines' next task--attack on Wana Draw, another terrain stronghold provided by nature and perfected by the Japanese. This position held the key to the defense of Shuri Castle, site of the Japanese headquarters. Japanese propaganda had warned that the taking of Wana would be 90 times more difficult than the capture of Iwo Jima.

Initially, progress was painfully slow, as it became necessary first to locate and then to destroy enemy weapons guarding the draw's mouth. This procedure was required because the open ground between the 5th and the draw afforded attacking Marines no opportunity whatsoever for concealment, cover, or surprise through maneuver. Repeated attacks gained little. On 20 May, the direction of attack shifted from Wana towards the heights to Shuri Castle. Following that successful movement, the regiment headed for the castle. On the 21st, however, rains, which had started on the 18th, virtually halted progress. Across the army front, activity was limited to the dispatching of strong combat patrols.

When attacks resumed on 28 May, 1/5 elements advanced almost 1,000 yards to a point south of the town of Asato, directly west of Shuri and on the outskirts of Naha. The battalion's attack the next day quickly gained the crest of Shuri Ridge. Taking advantage of the success, the division commander ordered the continuation of the attack to take the castle. The battalion commander immediately sent out Company A along the still muddy ridge. The company overwhelmed the few remaining defenders and secured the former enemy headquarters by 1015. Later in the afternoon 1/5 struck out again, this time to the south.

The enemy was on the run. Back on 26 May, observers in both 1st and 5th Marines' front lines had noted increased enemy movements southward, away from the castle. Air observation soon spotted the concentrated enemy, and within 13 minutes naval gunfire was on the target. All other supporting arms within range joined in. Many of the withdrawing enemy were caught in the rain of deadly steel. On the last day of May, as the regiment advanced (with 3/5 making the main effort) against only scattered resistance, it was clear that the Japanese still were retreating. The regiment pursued, gaining control of the main east-west road (2 June) and driving about a mile south the next day. On the 4th, the 1st Marines commenced relief of the 5th, which reverted to IIIAC reserve.

On 15 June, the 5th Marines returned to the lines just east of Itoman to engage the enemy for the last time in World War II. Its attack to the south was met by desperate defenders employing heavy and accurate fires. Torrential rains accompanied the attacks at times and slowed assaults against Hills 79 and 81, about 4,500 yards north of Ara Point. On 19 June, while attacks were still going on against the two hill objectives, 3/5 secured the town of Makabe, just south of the heights. On the 21st, 1/5 captured Hill 79 in the early afternoon. The attack continued against Hill 81. Just before 1700, as elements of 2/5 neared the crest, the enemy fire slackened and soon the hill fell to the battalion. This was the end of organized resistance in the IIIAC zone, and the last Marine ground fight of World War II. Until the end of June, however, the 5th Marines assisted in the division mop up of the island in its assigned zone. The regiment remained on Okinawa until 29 September, when it sailed for a different type duty on the Chinese mainland.

China and Guam(36)

Before departing Okinawa, IIIAC units had been training for the invasion of Japan. When the war suddenly ended, the corps' mission was changed to assisting the Chinese Central Government (through the Chinese Nationalist Army) in accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in the Hopeh Province (in North China) and in repatriating the thousands of Japanese soldiers and civilians therein. This mass of people presented no problem to the Marines, but the Chinese Communists did.

Corps units began landing on 30 September 1945, at Taku,

on the mouth of the Hai River, 30 miles southeast of Tientsin. In this latter city, the 1st Marine Division established headquarters. The 5th Marines arrived in Peiping, 65 miles beyond Tientsin on 7 October. From this ancient Chinese city, the regiment provided security for the two airfields in the vicinity and protection to nearby communication routes and facilities. On 29 October, the 1st Battalion moved down river to guard the railhead at Tangku and control Taku, the main port of entry for North China.

Although other Marine regiments throughout the IIIAC area of responsibility frequently encountered Chinese Communists, the 5th Marines found no major trouble within its sector, initially. In January 1946, it appeared that the situation would even improve, for under the influence of the Americans, both the Chinese Nationalists and Communists agreed to a cease-fire. In April, however, the latter violated the truce by moving a large number of troops north into Manchuria just as Soviet occupation troops were withdrawing. While the Chinese Communists were taking over such vast areas and building up their strength, Marines were sending many of their numbers to the States for return to civilian life. In mid-April the regiments' 3d Battalions were disbanded. Since, by that time, there were very few veterans remaining, the regiment began an intensive schooling program on China duty.

Reduction in personnel was accompanied, fortunately, by a lessening of area of responsibility. Nationalist forces began taking over sectors held by the Marines. In May 1946, the Marines' mission in North China had been completed sufficiently to permit removal of most Marines from occupation duty. One area, at Tangshan, on the rail line 50 miles northeast of Taku, remained a trouble spot. Regimental headquarters had moved there on 8 April. Earlier, in March, the 2d Battalion had moved to Linsi, adjacent to the railroad and 15 miles beyond Tangshan. In these locations, the regiment (minus 1/5) remained until September when it returned to Peiping to assume its new mission of providing security to American personnel and property there. The 1st Battalion remained in the Taku-Tangku area with the responsibility for security of the railroad, the port of Taku, and the supply installations.

In 19 months of North China duty, the 5th Marines had two significant encounters with the Communists. Both involved 1/5, and each engagement centered around an ammunition dump. On the night of 3-4 October 1946, one Marine was wounded while helping to repel an attack by a Chinese company on the Hsin-Ho dump.


Investigation revealed that some ammunition was stolen, and that Communists took it. Most of the ammunition was recovered.

A second attack, the last major one against the 1st Division in North China, and the worst between the 5th Marines and the enemy of Nationalist China, was larger and better planned. At 0115, 5 April 1947, a bugle call broke the night's silence and brought over 300 Communists attacking two of the eight dump areas, within the compound, from three different positions. The attack commander, anticipating quick reaction by 1/5, had set up an ambush and mined the road over which the help would have to travel. As the Company C relief column arrived, the lead vehicle hit a mine and the ambushers opened fire. Immediately, the Marines detrucked and returned the fire, driving the Communists back after a brief fight. At the two dumps, meanwhile, the raiders loaded up the cased ammunition, blew up what remained, and withdrew. Pursuit by 1/5 elements failed to regain contact with the attackers. In all, 1/5 suffered 5 killed and 16 wounded. The Chinese left behind 6 dead and took away an estimated 20-30 wounded.

Five weeks later, those 1st Division units remaining in China were withdrawn. Most returned to the States, but certain aviation, artillery, and other supporting units moved with the 5th Marines to Guam to form the bulk of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The 5th reached the Pacific bastion by 31 May, and on 1 June 1947, became a part of the brigade. Most of the 5th's regimental headquarters organization was transferred to brigade headquarters. In October, the 2d Battalion was detached to form the 9th Marines. Then, as a one-battalion regiment, the 5th trained to increase the proficiency of its members, many of whom were without previous military experience. Highlight of the Guam training was a fleet landing exercise in the spring of 1949.

In the fall of that year, while the one-battalion 5th was still on Guam, another major regimental reorganization occurred. At Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, Oceanside, California, elements of the 1st, 6th, and 7th Marines were used to form the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 5th Marines. On the date of this shifting (1 October) Colonel Victor H. Krulak became the regimental commander. The Guam-based 3d Battalion joined the rest of the regiment at Camp Pendleton in February 1950. It was most fortunate that the regiment had been rebuilt, as there was soon need for it in a little-known land in the Far East.

KOREA AS A BATTLEFIELD



Scale: 1 inch = 80 miles

Korea(37)

On 25 June 1950, the Communist North Korean People's Army (NKPA) surged over the 38th Parallel, attacking South Korea without justification or warning. Within two days, the United Nations (UN) had condemned North Korea for its action and asked member nations for assistance to repel the invasion. On 29 June, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the American commander in the Far East, received authorization to employ his forces. Naval and air forces immediately responded, and by 4 July, United States ground forces were in contact with the North Koreans.

When news of the peace-breaking attack reached Washington, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Clifton B. Cates, immediately recommended employment of Fleet Marine Force units. On 2 July, the recommendation, concurred in by General MacArthur, was approved and orders for the movement of a Regimental Combat Team (RCT) with a Marine Aircraft Group to the Far East were sent to Camp Pendleton, where on 7 July, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade was activated. It consisted, in the main, of the understrength 5th Marines (each infantry battalion had only two of its three rifle companies) and Marine Aircraft Group 33. Brigadier General Edward Craig commanded the brigade while Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman headed the air unit and served as brigade deputy commander. The brigade sailed on 14 July and after an uneventful voyage reached Pusan on 2 August. The Marine air/ground team was the first land force sent from the United States to Korea. (See map, inside back cover).

Within a half day after arrival, the brigade began a motor march to occupy Eighth Army reserve positions around Changwon, about 40 miles to the northwest. On 6 August, the Marines attached to Major General William B. Dean's 25th Infantry Division, moved 13 miles southwest to Chindong-ni. Shortly after midnight, the reinforced 1st Platoon, Company G, 3/5, was ordered to assist in the defense of Hill 342, overlooking the village from the northwest. Carrying out that task involved the first fighting for Marine ground troops in Korea. Defense of the hill cost 11 Marine lives, but the enemy lost about 30 times that number killed.

A few days later, the regiment spearheaded the first Eighth Army counterattack in Korea. Moving rapidly, the 5th Marines attacked to the southwest and captured Kosong on the 11th. Immediately, the Marines turned to the northwest toward Sachon. While carrying out this attack the next day, the 5th received

two orders. The first required the dispatching of a reinforced battalion back to Chindong-ni to assist the 25th Division in restoring its overrun lines. An augmented 3/5 got this assignment and accomplished it with little trouble. The second directive, received about nightfall, when Sachon was only four miles away, required the rest of the regiment to move to another trouble spot on the defensive line around Pusan.

When Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray's 5th Marines reassembled at Miryang on 15 August, the regiment learned the reason for the withdrawal action. To the northwest in the sector of the 24th Infantry Division, the hardened and battle-tested North Korean People's Army (NKPA) 4th Infantry Division had broken across the Naktong River, the last natural barrier of the Pusan Perimeter, and advanced to the east. The Eighth Army (EUSAK) then directed the 24th Division, with the Marine brigade and the 2d Infantry Division's 9th Infantry (Regiment) attached, to restore the lines.

In the First Battle of the Naktong, 17-19 August 1950, the regiment, in a series of assaults, secured the three objectives assigned it and drove the enemy into and across the river, thereby restoring the 24th Division lines. The success of this battle was due to many reasons, but the chief of these was a combination of air/ground teamwork by a disciplined and well-led organization. Ground assaults on objectives were coordinated with strikes from the air and were preceded and supported by artillery. Prompt evacuation of casualties, who could not receive adequate treatment at the battle area, kept the number of deaths from wounds to a minimum.

On 20 August the brigade moved back to an area, near Masan, called the "Bean Patch." Here, in the role of Eighth Army reserve, the Marines received replacements, rested, and trained in a large bean field. This routine was a welcome relief for the weary regiment after 14 days of expelling North Koreans from the Pusan Perimeter.

Next, the brigade returned to the Naktong River scene of its mid-August fighting for a second counteroffensive. This time the NKPA 9th Division had penetrated the 2d Infantry Division lines in the sector of the 9th Infantry, beside which the 5th had fought not only in the First Naktong Battle but also during World War I while attached to this same Army division. The Red Korean drive was moving closer to Yongsan as the 5th Marines marched west to beat back the aggressors.

En route to its line of departure on 3 September, the 5th had to clear out enemy troops that had smashed through the lines of the outnumbered 9th Infantry. The 1st and 2d Battalions routed the North Korean infiltrators and then launched the main attack. Gains that day carried an enemy-held ridge, and on 4 September, 3/5, which took up the attack from the badly shot up 2d Battalion, seized Hill 117. The regiment's attack to the west resumed immediately, with 1/5 still on the left and 3/5 on the right. As they advanced along the Main Supply Route (MSR) Marines noticed hundreds of NKPA dead, and saw the remains of a long enemy convoy that had been caught by Marine air and artillery.

The 1st Battalion took the lead when the brigade continued the advance on 5 September. Later, 3/5 swung south and came up on 1/5's left, to get into position for a planned regimental two-pronged attack later in the day. The first objectives were Hill 125 and Observation Hill. These the 1st Battalion soon took and, later, repulsed heavy counterattacks against them. Then, as the remaining enemy were retreating, the regiment received the news that it was to be withdrawn to Pusan for further operations against the enemy in still another area.

A fast pace of activities awaited the 7 September arrival of the brigade in Pusan, for in less than one week, four tasks had to be accomplished before embarking for the next operation at Inchon. New replacements, in the form of the long-awaited third rifle companies for each infantry battalion, had to be processed into the 5th Marines. The regiment also had to draw and prepare new equipment and service the old. Many in the regiment were required to help train the 3,000 troops of the 1st Korean Marine Regiment that was, for the next operation, to become the 1st Marine Division's fourth infantry regiment.(38) Not the least of these tasks was the fourth, combat loading--embarking the brigade so that it would land at Inchon prepared to fight according to the tactical plans, plans which the brigade could not prepare because of the shortage of time. Somehow, all four were completed. On the first minute of 13 September, the brigade was deactivated, and its units assumed their former division designations. By that time, the reinforced 1st Marine Division (less the 7th Marines) as a part of X Corps, Eighth Army was en route to the objective on Korea's western coast.

Late on 14 September 1950, the 5th Marines began final preparations for landing at Inchon. The plan for the beach assault called for 3/5 to make an early landing on the center (Green) beach and seize the island of Wolmi-do to ensure the

uninterrupted flow of the main landing to follow and to protect the division rear. The rest of the regiment would land farther north on Beach Red, seize the assigned area in its zone of action and, after effecting juncture with the 1st Marines landing over the southern beach, continue operations to the east.

Planners of the Inchon-Seoul campaign had hoped that the capture of the latter city would sever the NKPA lines of communication to the southeast, thereby isolating the great majority (90 percent) of enemy troops engaged in the Pusan Perimeter fighting. In addition, it was realized that this western Korean area would provide a base suitable for launching and supporting future operations to the north. There were, however, numerous risks in landing at Inchon, but despite the unusual and complex problems inherent in undertaking the amphibious assault at Inchon(39) the landings on 15 September came off essentially as planned. BLT 3/5 landed over Beach Green at 0633 against light resistance. By 0800, Wolmi-do was declared secure, but Marines continued to round up stragglers, and took up defensive positions until 2000, when 3/5 crossed over the causeway to the mainland and rejoined the regiment.

At 1731, the balance of the 5th Marines' assault units commenced landing. Resistance varied from heavy to light in the 1st Battalion zone on the left, and from light to negligible in the 2d Battalion's zone. Before midnight the regiment took Cemetery Hill and the larger Observatory Hill, about 1,000 yards inland. On the 16th, the 5th advanced an additional 7,500 yards against sporadic opposition to the outskirts of Ascom City.(40) During the day, the Korean regiment, operating under control of the 5th Marines, screened for loyalty the Koreans remaining in Inchon. The regiment's advance on 17 September ended with 2/5's tank-supported seizure of Kimpo Airfield and by 1/5's taking commanding terrain southeast of the field. Both battalions withstood counterattacks by groups of ill-prepared and poorly-equipped North Korean troops. Earlier, 3/5, the reserve, had assisted the Korean Marines in clearing the western portion of Ascom City.

Resistance in front of the regiment was very light. Many of the defenders had fled from the attacking Marines and crossed the Han River for safety from the ground troops. The enemy's haven was to be temporary only, however, as plans were underway already for getting the reinforced division across the Han. In addition, with the capture of the fine Kimpo airfield at 1000 on 18 September, and simultaneous operation of Marine aircraft from it, the North Koreans were going to be subjected to more

lengthy and devastating air strikes.

Continuing the pursuit of the enemy, in conjunction with division plans for the river crossing, the 5th Marines, on 19 September, advanced to the Han and established sites for movement to the opposite bank. Only 1/5 met with any determined resistance while obtaining ground from which to protect crossing sites. When the regiment was positioned to lead the division across the river, other units moved forward to support the crossing. On 20 September at 0650, LVT-borne elements of 3/5 began landing near Haengju on the far bank. Although the enemy employed crew-served weapons against the LVTs, the protection afforded by the amphibians' armor was sufficient to prevent casualties to embarked troops. The battalion deployed from the amtracs and moved out to seize the terrain commanding the vehicle exits from the river. Then, at 1000, 2/5 started crossing in LVTs also. Many Marines in this battalion remained embarked for about two miles beyond the Han in order to negotiate a swamp and a creek without delay. In the afternoon, the 1st Battalion and regimental headquarters crossed, and by nightfall, the regiment had a firm bridgehead for the division.

Once together on the north side of the river, the 5th set out to uncover the northwest approaches to the main Seoul bridge sites. In this advance to the capital city, the 5th Marines met determined resistance for the first time since the Inchon landing. The Red command had moved the 25th Brigade of some 4,500 troops and the 78th Independent Regiment, about half that number, against the 5th Marines. Within five days, this enemy force was all but exterminated by the combined efforts of the 5th, division artillery, and Marine air. The enemy, individually and by units, fought with great skill and tenacity, but fell victim to Marine air/ground teamwork. On 27 September, 3/5 elements reached Seoul's government compound, struck the enemy flag, and raised the United States colors.

After securing its portion of Seoul, the 5th Marines took up blocking positions to the northwest, and conducted a reconnaissance in force to Suyuhyon, which it occupied on 2 October. This action was the last of the Inchon-Seoul campaign for the regiment as it began movement to Inchon to embark for still another area of operations.

When they were boarding ships at Inchon, few Marines could have guessed that the next fight would be beyond the 38th Parallel in North Korea. The decision to cross the boundary

between North and South Korea in pursuit of the enemy was made only after lengthy high-level debate, and, by coincidence, was reached on the same date that the 5th raised the American flag in Seoul. As the 5th Marines was embarking at Inchon, units of the Eighth Army crossed the border north of Seoul in a drive to the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. On Korea's east coast, Republic of Korea (ROK) Army troops crossed the border and took Wonsan on 11 October and the Hamhung-Hungnam-Yonpo Airfield area six days later. It was at Wonsan that the 1st Division would land. Once ashore, the division, still a part of X Corps, would attack west to the enemy capital and join up with other Eighth Army units there. The move west was expected to cut off an enemy retreat from the south.

Debarkation at Wonsan was delayed because of the presence of a large number of mines in the harbor. While the Navy cleared them, the ships with embarked Marines steamed north and south, up and down the coast off Wonsan in what has been called Operation YO-YO. Finally, on 25 October, units of the division, including advance elements of the 5th Marines, began an administrative landing. Ashore by the 26th, the regiment was about to enter into a most critical phase of its history, but, at that time, there were few if any signs to so indicate.

Just before the division landed at Wonsan, the United Nations Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, ordered a change in the X Corps mission. Unexpected successes during the Eighth Army advance had accomplished what the corps' advance from Wonsan to Pyongyang was intended to do. MacArthur, therefore, voided the 1st Division's movement to the west and directed instead a speedy northward thrust to the Manchurian border. The 5th Marines drew the task of relieving ROK troops at Fusen Reservoir, 100 air miles directly north of Wonsan, and denying enemy entrance into the Marines' zone. On 4 November, 2/5, which earlier had been attached to the 1st Marines, relieved the 18th ROK Regiment in the Sinhung Valley, 25 miles below Fusen Reservoir. Ten days later, the battalion relieved 7th Marine elements at Koto-ri, on the MSR 75 miles north of Wonsan. The remainder of the regiment, meanwhile, had been advancing along the main road behind the 7th Marines.

On 17 November the division directed the regiment to advance up the east side of the Chosin Reservoir--a 13-mile, north-south oriented body of water that terminated at Hagaru--in order to seize the vital town of Kyomul-li, about five miles past the north end of the reservoir. Forward progress in this direction

halted halfway to the objective on 25 November when X Corps issued still another mission change--a shift of effort to the west in order to assist Eighth Army units in north-central Korea. The division attack was to move out of Yudam-ni west to Mupyong-ni, 40 miles away. The 5th Marines was directed to pass through the 7th and take up the advance on the 27th. In compliance, Lieutenant Colonel Murray led off with 2/5, which made about a mile before setting up in defensive positions on the slopes of Northwest and Southwest Ridges, north and south of the new MSR, before dusk. That night, 1/5 was in the valley east of Yudam-ni, and 3/5 in an assembly area north of the town, at the base of North Ridge.

The night of 27 November brought the second abrupt temperature drop in two days, this time to 20 degrees below zero. The bitter cold froze both men and machines. By 2100, elements of the Red Chinese 9th Army Group, consisting of some nine divisions specifically sent to Korea to destroy the 1st Marine Division, had moved quickly and quietly to positions on North and Northwest Ridges. After a probing attack, the enemy withdrew, but at 2125, he launched a massive attack centered at the 2d Battalion. The assault breached the battalion's lines, but heavy accurate fires from regimental weapons, and timely employment of battalion reserves ended the enemy attack and killed most of his troops. Hundreds of dead Chinese were counted in 2/5's area.

Other enemy attacks on the night of 27-28 November hit numerous division units. Some of his movements gained key terrain in the north, and cut the MSR south of Yudam-ni. Although counterattacks early on the 28th by elements of 1/5 and 3/5 restored some of the ground lost in the 5th Marines area, elsewhere the enemy's position and his overwhelming numerical superiority threatened to cut the division into several pieces. The enemy had applied particular pressure at Hagaru, the division's supporting base 14 miles south of Yudam-ni. On 29 and 30 November, the division issued the 5th and 7th Marines orders initiating a breakout from Yudam-ni and an attack to the south.

While division units were fighting to save Hagaru and the perimeter 11 miles farther south at Koto-ri, units of the 5th and 7th Marines, in contact with the enemy northwest of Yudam-ni, began to disengage on 1 December. Later that day, the line around Yudam-ni was set up one mile south of the town. Then, at 1400, 3/5 began the breakout by attacking south astride the MSR. During the next two days, 3/5 moved south, fighting from hilltop to hilltop, repulsing frequent Chinese attempts to gain control

of vital ridges. The main column, meanwhile, moved along the road. Just before noon on 3 December, elements of 1/7, which had been advancing to the left (east) of 3/5, drove a disorganized enemy battalion towards Taktong Pass--and 3/5. When the enemy group neared his lines, 3/5's commander called for an air strike upon the Chinese. As the Marine planes were hitting the Communists with rockets and napalm, the two converging battalions poured out mortar and machine gun fire. By 1030, the Chinese battalion was eliminated.

From Taktong Pass to Hagaru the going was less difficult, at least when measured against the amount of enemy interference. The hardest part for the Marines was the sight of the brave, cold, walking wounded painfully hobbling and struggling in the southbound column. Casualties had been so heavy that all the wounded could not be evacuated by air or placed on wheeled vehicles. Somehow, they made it to Hagaru.

At Hagaru, the 5th Marines, with 3/1 attached, drew the mission of perimeter defense during the two-day stay. For the division, one of the major tasks at Hagaru was evacuation of wounded, and, in completing it, much credit went to the transport elements of Marine, Navy, and Air Force commands. Their pilots flew out a total of 4,312 casualties the first five days of December. Credit, too, went to medical personnel. Lieutenant Commander Chester M. Lessendon, the 5th's surgeon, remained on the job despite painfully frozen feet, and his devotion to duty helped speed seriously wounded Marines to hospitals in the rear.

At 0700 on 6 December, the 7th Marines began the advance south to Koto-ri. To assist the breakout, 2/5 attacked a Chinese-held thorn in the division's side, East Hill. In a 22-hour fight, the hill finally fell, but not before the battalion suffered numerous casualties. During a night portion of the battle, the enemy kept charging into the battalion's fires in an effort to break up 2/5's attacks. When the struggle ended, some estimates of enemy dead in front of 2/5 ran as high as 800. Shortly after the hill had become Marine property, the division completed the move to Koto-ri.

In the division attack from Koto-ri to Hungnam, the 5th Marines' mission was to seize commanding terrain east of the MSR. This was done without difficulty on 8 December by 1/5, with some help by a patrol from the Army Provisional Battalion, attached to the 7th Marines. For most of the rest of the way to Hungnam, the regiment was in the division column, advancing

behind the 7th Marines. By 2100, 11 December 1950, all regimental units were in the Hungnam area, and within two days, the regiment was loaded aboard ship, ready to sail with the division to another area.

One week later, the regiment pulled into the Masan Bean Patch, much to the surprise--and delight, almost--of the Marines who had spent a few days there during the August interlude between the Naktong battles. The program, too, was much the same --concentrating on rebuilding the physical condition of the Marines with exercises, athletic contests, and good food. Gradually, the military aspect of the rebuilding assumed more importance. Most equipment destroyed during the Chosin Reservoir campaign was replaced. Major shortages in some vehicles and radios still existed, however, when the division departed the Bean Patch.

In mid-January 1951, the 1st Marine Division, detached from X Corps and operating directly under Eighth Army control, moved to an area around Pohang, 65 miles north of Pusan. The mission was to protect the 75 miles of MSR within this vast and mountainous sector from possible attacks by a large force of North Korean guerrillas reported to be in the area. Patrolling was the only feasible method of watching over the supply route and of seeking out and destroying the enemy. Although the regiment's patrols seldom encountered the North Koreans, the participants found this type activity most valuable. Almost one-third of the regiment was untested in battle, and the constant threat of ambush or sniper fire served to keep new and old alike on the alert.

Moving day came again in mid-February, when the division, assigned to IX Corps, motored to the central front for the purpose of stemming a major Chinese counterattack. Division Operation Order 6-51 placed the 1st and 5th Marines in the attack, with the 5th on the right, on 21 February. Because of heavy traffic on the muddy MSR, the 5th Marines barely made it to the line of departure (41) at Wonju, 115 miles northwest of Pohang. Fortunately, enemy resistance initially was light, and continued so through the next three days. Then, the regiment went into division reserve and carried on in this capacity for the rest of this engagement, Operation KILLER.

Operation RIPPER, a continuation of the attack north, began on 7 March, while the 5th was still on its tour as division reserve. The regiment returned to the lines on 17 March, attacking on the left of the 1st Marines. Again the resistance was light.

On 20 March, the division continued its forward movement, this time with the 1st Korean Marine Regiment attacking between the 5th on the left and the 1st Marines. Still the enemy put up so little effort in combating the IX Corps' 16-mile advance that, by 2 April, the 5th Marines had carried the division up to a natural terrain barrier, the deep and swift-running Soyang River, fordable in a few places only. The 5th's executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, devised a plan to get the 5th Marines across. After the regiment had crossed, without a single casualty, Lieutenant Colonel Stewart learned that his orders for return to the States had arrived. Of the original members in the brigade that landed in Pusan, 2 August 1950, he was the last to depart Korea.

Once across, the 5th continued north to reach its assigned objectives. On 5 April, the regiment was relieved by elements of the 7th Infantry Division. After 10 days of patrolling near the front lines, the 5th Marines, on 21 April, was poised in the division center to resume the attack. The order to launch it was cancelled, however, so the regiment consolidated its positions and conducted patrols in zone. Then, as the Marines had expected after weeks of light resistance, the regrouped Chinese unleashed a tremendous attack on the night of 22-23 April, striking primarily against ROK units to the regiment's right. Later attacks, concentrating on the 6th ROK Division to the left of the 1st Marine Division, forced the Marines to begin the planned, orderly return to more defensible terrain, called NO NAME Line. Here, Marines patrolled forward and improved the defenses in preparation for continuation of the enemy counter-attack. That offensive resumed on 16 May, striking to the east (right) of the Marines. Two days later, the 1st and 5th Marines moved east to assist units under attack. On 20 May, elements of an enemy regiment, apparently en route to occupy ground already held by 3/5, were surprised by the battalion, which killed 152 and captured 15 of the Communists. This was the last Marine ground action of the rapidly decaying 1951 Communist China Spring Offensive. UN forces were ready to hit back.

Failure of the enemy to maintain his counterattack opened the way for resumption of the advance by UN forces, including the 1st Marine Division, reassigned to X Corps. The 5th Marines moved forward on 23 May to capture the vital road center of Yanggu, 17 miles east of Hwachon. In this advance, the regiment protected the division right flank. The negligible resistance encountered indicated the enemy was continuing his retreat rapidly to the nearby mountains directly in front of the pursuing 5th

Marines. At the end of May, the 5th was 6,000 yards northeast of Yanggu. By that time, many of the enemy had made their way into the hills where the terrain was better suited for defense.

Indications of stiffening opposition appeared during the division push on 1 June. On Hill 651 the enemy defended so tenaciously that 2/5 had to request the aid of Marine air to help secure that objective. The next day, Hill 610 held up the advance of 1/5. This time, tanks helped break down the defenders. Against a series of such stubbornly defended hills, the 5th Marines drove forward, day after day. Hills became ridges, but the advance continued until objectives on KANSAS Line, an Eighth Army control mark, were secured on 17 June 1951. Minor adjustments to this line carried the regiment forward another mile on 19 June. Then began a period of waiting, during which the regiment improved upon its positions and sent patrols forward.

Communist requested truce talks brought about this spell of relatively little activity forward of the line. Fighting continued, nevertheless, but on a much diminished basis, and took the form of establishing patrol bases on the phase line immediately to the front, BADGER Line. On 15 July, the 2d Infantry Division relieved the 1st Marine Division, which reverted to X Corps reserve. The 5th Marines, however, remained under operational control of X Corps in ready reserve near Inje, about 15 miles to the south, and still almost five miles north of the 38th Parallel.

After the Communists walked out of the truce talks on 22 August, the 1st Marine Division returned to the front to attack on 31 August 1951. During this advance, the 5th Marines assumed the Division frontline patrol and rear-area security missions. The enemy defense, light at first, soon became so spirited that on the night of 2-3 September, he sent out patrols not only against the division front lines but also into the rear area. Despite the increased enemy resistance, the division's advance carried it to the HAYS Line, five miles from the 31 August attack position. On 9 September, the division resumed the attack with the 5th Marines holding virtually the same mission.

In the middle of September, the 5th went back into the front lines and immediately plunged into an attack against Hill 812. The 2d Battalion made the main effort, which 3/5 supported. The move, launched late on the 16th, was halted by darkness. When the Marines jumped off early on the 17th, they caught the Communists at breakfast. Taking advantage of the surprise, the

regiment drove ahead rapidly at first, but gradually the enemy returned to his positions and slowed the 5th's advance. When the defenders increased their fires, the 2/5 commander countered with all available fire support, followed by a company charge against the hill and a platoon flanking attack. In just 26 minutes the objective fell to the battalion's envelopment, but not before some close-in fighting.

A small but significant fight over this same terrain took place two days later, and involved the same formula for success. Early on 19 September, the enemy, by heavy fire power and weight of numbers, retook a portion of Hill 812. At 0500, a second 2/5 counterattack, again using the company frontal-assault and the platoon flank-attack scheme, regained that portion of the hill lost two hours earlier. That fight was the last offensive-type action for Marines in Korea.

The new phase in the Korean fighting for all United Nations frontline units was termed position warfare. It was characterized by establishment of a strong defensive line from which patrols to maintain enemy contact were sent out. No offensive attacks were utilized, although raids into enemy territory were conducted. The area from which the 1st Marine Division executed this aggressive defense was Line MINNESOTA. For the 5th Marines, in the division center, this line ran across the positions held on 19 September. Here, the regiment participated in the new type warfare until relieved, on 11 October 1951, by the 7th Marines.

The 5th Marines returned to the front on 11 November in a somewhat spectacular relief of the 1st Marines on the division left. The movement, Operation SWITCH, was made mainly by helicopter to Hill 884 (Mount Helicopter) and was the largest such lift to that date. Once back in the lines, the regiment sent out patrols, but the enemy seemed to avoid contact. Then, when the communists agreed to resume truce negotiations, contact was even less frequent. On 19 December, relief of the 2d Battalion by the 1st was accomplished by helicopter. A New Year's Eve patrol from 1/5, the first Marine action of 1952, waited in ambush for an enemy patrol. Before daylight, a North Korean patrol walked into the trap; one of the enemy was killed and four were wounded. There were no Marine casualties. The 5th remained in the lines until 10 January 1952, when relieved again by the 7th.

Back in the division reserve area at Camp Tripoli, about

17 miles south of the front, the regiment maintained a busy schedule. Intensive periods of instruction kept the old timers mentally sharp and provided needed information for new personnel in the regiment. Camp facilities were constantly improved and patrols to destroy and capture guerrillas were dispatched. While in the reserve area, the 5th Marines joined with the rest of the division in executing Operation CLAM-UP, an Eighth Army-planned feigned withdrawal designed to get the enemy to move forward from his positions. The enemy at first did send a few patrols out toward the frontline units but did not dispatch any into the 5th Marines' sector.

On 17 February, it was back to the lines again for the 5th, this time exchanging places with the 1st. The relief was the first conducted at night in Korea. Most of the enemy action along the entire division front was centered against 2/5. On 26 March, after relief by ROK troops, the 5th Marines departed on the East-Central front to occupy much more extensive positions on the Western front guarding the historic invasion corridor to Seoul. On 29 March, the regiment took over an area occupied by the earlier-arriving 1st Marines, which then was able to contract its thinly-held line and assume a more realistic defensive capability.

In western Korea, the 5th Marines defended the center of the division's sector on the JAMESTOWN Line, north of Seoul in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. The major task of the regiment was improvement of the line itself. When relief by the 7th Marines took place on 11 May, the 5th's portion of the line had been strengthened considerably. On 15 June, the 5th Marines assumed from the 1st Marines responsibility for the extreme right of the division's sector. In support of the main line of resistance (MLR), the regiment manned 5 to 10 combat outposts and up to 20 listening posts and conducted aggressive patrolling. On the night of 5-6 July, the regiment was attacked by two Communist battalions. After the struggle had progressed to the close-in fighting stage, the enemy decided to withdraw, but not before many of his attacking troops had fallen.

After some time spent in reserve, the regiment returned to the lines on 12 October, relieving the 1st Marines. From this date until late March 1953, there was no significant enemy activity against the 5th Marines. While in the frontline positions, the regiment continued to man the posts and outposts. February 1953 was the most active month in this half-year span. Activities included the laying of 3,780 miles of barbed wire

during Operation TANGLEWIRE. The regiment conducted three successful daylight raids that month, and during the interval 23-27 February, the 5th Marines received supplies by helicopter in a test to determine the feasibility of logistical support by such aircraft. When the division went back into reserve, the regiment participated in extensive combat training, including command post and amphibious exercises.

The comparative peace in the 5th's sector ended on the night of 26 March 1953, when the enemy launched a limited objective attack against combat outposts CARSON, VEGAS, and RENO. The latter two fell, but a counterattack, with 2/7 helping, on the next day succeeded in regaining VEGAS. Eight days after "The Battle of the Cities," the 5th Marines moved to the rear. Immediately, it instituted a training program, but the effects of Korean weather abruptly ended that activity. Hard rains and a spring thaw had materially weakened the rear area trench and bunker fortifications, so the regiment spent the rest of its division reserve time in rebuilding them. From division reserve, the 5th moved back to I Corps reserve, where improvement of that area was also carried out. Later, the regiment conducted training, the highlight of which was a regimental landing exercise.

A final tour on the front lines for the regiment began on 7 July. Seventeen days later, the enemy launched a piecemeal night attack against combat outpost ESTHER, in the 3/5 sector. The Communists penetrated the outpost trenches and were turned back only after reinforcements from the MLR countercharged in conjunction with effective supporting arms fire.

Repulsing that attack was the last significant fight for the regiment. Three days later, on 27 July at 2200, the terms of the Korean cease-fire took effect. And, in an additional 72 hours, both enemy and friendly forces had retired from the established Line of Demarcation. In the rear of this neutral line, the 5th Marines manned the division general outpost line (GOPL) north of the Imjin River. Here, the regiment remained until 1 June 1954. Although the agreement promised to end the combat and actually brought about the dismantling of the front lines within the Demilitarized Zone, the division maintained immediate readiness to re-engage the enemy should he violate the truce.

To keep its Marines in the required state of preparation, the regiment participated in training and athletic programs, thereby ensuring the highest state of military proficiency, discipline, and morale. In September 1953, the 5th Marines

provided personnel for the 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company, whose task it was to police the UN portion of the Demilitarized Zone in the 1st Marine Division sector. Policing of this zone was accomplished by military police escort, patrols, and listening posts. Upon relief by the 1st Marines at the GOPL, the 5th assumed the division reserve missions. On 12 June 1954, the regiment embarked at Inchon to conduct a regimental landing exercise. The success of this maneuver testified to the validity of the regimental programs during the previous 10 months, for the combat readiness and morale of the troops were found to be excellent.

For six more months after return from this exercise the regiment continued its reserve role. Battalions and supporting companies conducted their own training, which was capped by landing exercises. Battalions of the regiment returned to the GOPL for brief stints, while the temporarily relieved frontline organizations moved to the rear to conduct landing exercises. Beginning on 21 August 1954, the 5th Marines had the additional duty of providing security of all US/UN installations in the I Corps rear area. The next month, a further additional duty, that of making available a mobile force to assist in controlling civil disturbances in Seoul, was assigned to the 5th. Relief from all tactical missions came on 25 January 1955, when the 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command Brigade took over the 5th Marines' duties. The regiment moved to Ascom City and then to Inchon for embarkation and return with the division to the United States.

Home(42)

A joyous welcome in San Diego on 17 March greeted the returning 1st Marine Division. The 5th Marines took part in a parade there before returning to Camp Pendleton. It had been almost five years since the regiment had left Pendleton for Korea. Back home in California, the regiment found the surrounding geography and climate well suited to its needs for varied, rugged, and realistic training. The expansive Camp Pendleton area permitted the regiment to train for warfare under nuclear or conventional conditions. Pendleton's terrain provided ground appropriate for maneuvering against an enemy employing conventional or guerrilla tactics, and its hills were more than adequate for helping maintain a battle-ready physical status. The coast along the camp contained beaches suitable for even a division landing. What Pendleton could not produce lay nearby. Desert training at Twentynine Palms and cold weather experience at

Bridgeport gave the regiment added knowledge and skills in fighting under environmental extremes. At both the home camp and desert base, the 5th Marines perfected the use of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft and employment of supporting artillery.

Very soon after its return from Korea, the regiment was on the move again. The activity was a seven-day training exercise culminating in an amphibious landing over the Pendleton beaches. From that June 1955 problem until 1962, the 5th Marines and its battalions participated in over 50 training exercises covering a wide range of purposes and objectives. The regiment tested and perfected techniques for amphibious landings by boat, amphibian tractor, and helicopter in daylight and at night. Against these beach assaults and maneuvers ashore, the regiment faced an "enemy" force employing the varied tactics which the 5th would most probably encounter in actual combat.

Although landing exercises highlighted the training, they were not the only tests utilized to gauge the regiment's combat readiness. Frequently, the 5th held field exercises to determine unit performance. Regimental and battalion commanders and their staffs conducted, and participated in, evaluation of command and staff procedures in the field. These same groups also worked with the division artillery regiment in coordinated employment of supporting arms. In the latter years of this period, the regiment pointed its activities towards preparations for night and counterinsurgency operations.

The regiment took part in field evaluations of Marine tactics, techniques, and equipment. Battalions conducted training with midshipmen from the U. S. Naval Academy and reserves from numerous training units. In June 1956, 2/5 carried out Operation FLATFOOT, a 100-mile conditioning tour of the camp.

Beginning in the later 1950's, the regiment entered into the Marine Corps system for stabilizing personnel scheduled for duty tours with the 3d Marine Division on Okinawa. By this method, well-trained battalion teams were transplaced from the 1st Division to the Far East for temporary tours as elements of the 3d Division.

Conclusion

Born of necessity in 1914, the 5th Regiment completed its initial mission in the waters of the Caribbean. During World

War I, the accomplishments of the 5th Regiment of Marines won for it a fame that spread to many parts of the world. In the comparatively peaceful times that followed, the 5th continued to respond to its country's needs. Against Nicaraguan bandit forces and in amphibious exercises, members of the regiment helped to develop and perfect the tactics, techniques, and equipment employed in Marine operations in the Pacific Islands campaign of World War II. Later, as the first United States-based ground force to enter the Korean fighting, the 5th Marines snatched the initiative from the Communist aggressors. Upon departing Korea, the 5th returned home, where it stood as a force in readiness until, once again, the regiment had to set foot on foreign soil to halt the spread of Communism in southeast Asia.

Except for an alert during the Cuban crisis in November 1962, peacetime training of the 5th Marines continued with relatively few changes until the military situation in southeast Asia once again called for the employment of American manpower against a determined enemy.

First of the 5th Marines units to depart from Camp Pendleton was the 1st Battalion, which, together with attached supporting units, left the west coast on 30 June 1965 to become the ground partner of the air-ground team of the 1st Marine Brigade at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. Upon its arrival at Hawaii, 1/5 moved into the quarters at the Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, previously occupied by the 4th Marines. Under the auspices of the brigade staff, the battalion underwent individual and small unit training. The Army's 25th Infantry Division training areas on Oahu and at Pohakaloa on the island of Hawaii were utilized to the maximum extent possible. An amphibious exercise was also conducted on nearby Molokai Island.

Following a final counterguerrilla exercise on the battalion level at Kahuku, 1/5 moved to Pearl Harbor. Embarkation for southeast Asia got under way on 19 February 1966, 21 years to the day that in another war and against an equally determined enemy, Marines had launched the invasion of Iwo Jima. Instead of proceeding to Okinawa for further training, as originally scheduled, 1/5 sailed to the island of Mindoro in the Philippines, where it made final preparations for combat.

After the departure of the 1st Battalion from Camp Pendleton, the remaining two battalions had continued their training with

extensive logistic and embarkation preparations which reached a climax at the end of 1965. On 10 January 1966, 2/5 embarked at Long Beach and sailed west. After a short stop at Hawaii, the battalion continued to White Beach, Okinawa in early February. The unit engaged in strenuous jungle and antipartisan warfare training in the island's Northern Training Area, designed to bring it to a peak of combat readiness. On 26 March, 3/5 debarked at White Beach and launched its own intensive training in the hills of northern Okinawa.

Meanwhile, events in southeast Asia had taken such a threatening turn that the immediate employment of a ready force became necessary. It was only natural that the 5th Marines, already deployed in the Western and Southwestern Pacific, should receive first call. On 26 March 1966, 1/5 went ashore in the Rung Sat area south of Saigon in an amphibious landing designated as Operation JACKSTAY. On 13 April, 2/5 landed at Chu Lai; on 18 June, 3/5 landed across the beach in Northern I Corps for Operation DECKHOUSE. For the first time since 30 June 1965, all three battalions were deployed in the same geographical zone.

The initial commitment of 1/5 and 3/5 came under the operational control of the Commander, Seventh Fleet with their designation as the Special Landing Forces (SLF). The 1st Battalion remained an SLF only until 6 May; 3/5 retained its status as an amphibious ready force until 2 August. Actually, neither battalion spent much of its time as an SLF afloat. The 1st Battalion's Operation JACKSTAY in the Rung Sat Special Zone lasted for 11 days until 8 April. Even though no contact with any sizable enemy forces was made, the BLT located and destroyed several Viet Cong sites and installations. Three weeks later, on 27 April, 1/5 landed in the Phu Loc area and took part in Operation OSAGE, which continued until 2 May. On that date, the unit reembarked and proceeded to Chu Lai. There, its status as an SLF ended; the battalion once again became an integral part of the parent regiment.

The participation of 3/5 in Operation DECKHOUSE I lasted nine days until 18 June; at that time, the BLT came under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division for Operation NATHAN HALE. On 30 June, 3/5 reverted to operational control of the Seventh Fleet and sailed to Subic Bay, P. I., the resupply and operating area for the SLF.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, had lost its BLT status on 6 May when it entered South Vietnam on a permanent basis. The

battalion moved into the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) previously occupied by 2/4. The battalion immediately began aggressive patrolling and ambushing throughout the area. Upon the arrival of 1/5 near Chu Lai, the latter battalion was assigned an area of responsibility and launched several intensive small unit operations.

Following replenishment and continued training in the Philippine Islands, 3/5 reembarked and headed for Vietnam again, this time going ashore in the northern portion of the I Corps area. This operation, called DECKHOUSE II, involved a combined helicopter-surface landing in the Gio Linh District of Quang Tri Province; the ensuing operation resulted in 280 confirmed Viet Cong killed. Subsequently, the SLF was placed under the operational control of Task Force Delta and employed in Operation HASTINGS in the Cam Lo District northwest of Dong Ha. HASTINGS was the largest engagement by the 5th Marines in Vietnam up to that time. It was apparent from the outset that the NVA (North Vietnam Army) troops would not easily surrender ground which they had held unchallenged for such a long time. The enemy fought continual delaying actions and on two occasions made a stand in strongly entrenched positions, including reinforced bunkers. Nevertheless, these defenses did not withstand the Marine assault, and the NVA suffered a heavy loss. At the end of the operation, 785 enemy dead were counted; in addition, sizable stores of ammunition and equipment were seized.

Next followed Operation COLORADO, a search and destroy operation involving the 5th Marines. Initially, from 6 through 10 August, light but steady contact was made with the enemy. On the latter date, the Marines encountered several VC battalions in a fortified village and drew heavy fire from mortars and recoilless rifles, .50 caliber machine guns, and an assortment of small arms. Retaliating with air strikes, artillery, and conventional small arms, the Marines forced the VC to withdraw, leaving behind a total of 177 dead.

In September, 2/5 moved north in support of Task Force Delta. There, under operational control of the 3d Marine Division in Operation PRAIRIE, the regiment conducted a reconnaissance in force. In the course of this operation, contact was comparatively light. Subsequently, 2/5 remained in the Dong Ha area under 3d Marine Division control until 7 December, when it returned to Chu Lai. At this time, while the 1st and 3d Battalions reverted to operational control of the 5th Marines, 2/5 was placed directly under operational control of the 1st Marine

Division following its return to Chu Lai.

Under this new and somewhat unique command setup, 2/5 on 30 December was assigned a new area of responsibility in the An Hoa area northwest of Chu Lai. Its mission was to provide security during the construction of an industrial complex vital to the economy of the Republic of Vietnam. Included in this area of responsibility was the site of the only soft coal mine in South Vietnam at Nong Son. One company was assigned to this mission.

In the absence of 2/5, 1/5 and 3/5 took part in Operations NAPA, MONTEREY, MUSTANG, LONGHORN, and ALPINE. These operations were designed to keep the enemy off balance and destroy and disrupt his buildup. The battalions also conducted several so-called "county fair" operations, for the purpose of wresting control of the civilian populace from the VC; "Golden Fleece" operations were designed to safeguard the fall rice harvests; 163 tons of this vital commodity were seized from the coffers of the Viet Cong.

Patrolling and spoiling operations continued through the winter and into early spring of 1967. Operation MISSISSIPPI, conducted by 2/5, produced the most significant contacts during this period. The battalion engaged in moderate to heavy combat, though only eight confirmed enemy dead could be booked for this operation.

In early January 1967, 2/5 executed Operation TUSCALOOSA within its new area of responsibility; there was little contact until 26 January. On that date, the battalion was returning to its combat base when it became involved in a heavy engagement which continued for nine hours and extended over several kilometers of ground. Heavy losses were imposed on the enemy who finally broke contact and abandoned the battlefield, leaving behind 79 dead. During the month of February, 3/5 had moderate contact with the enemy in the Duc Pho area in the course of Operation DESOTO, executed jointly with the 7th Marines.

Towards the end of March, the 5th Marines carried out Operation NEW CASTLE in Quang Nam Province, southwest of Da Nang. This operation was a prelude of things to come during the approaching summer. Elements of 2/5 on two occasions engaged enemy in battalion strength and routed him. More than 100 enemy were killed during these two encounters, even though Marines initiating the final contact ran into a horseshoe-shaped ambush.

With the end of the monsoon season on 21 April, the 5th Marines entered a period of fierce combat. On that date, two companies of 3/5 were helilifted into the Que Son Valley northwest of Tam Ky, to assist a company of 2/1 which was heavily engaged with a NVA Battalion. Contact remained constant throughout the day. On 22 April, two companies of 1/5 and the 3d Battalion Command Group were lifted into the Valley. The ensuing battle subsequently was to become known as UNION I. It produced 89 confirmed kills during the initial contact alone. In the course of the operation, both the 1st and 3d Battalions were committed against an NVA regiment. Fighting continued until 17 May, with some of the fiercest action occurring between the 12th and the 14th.

Fighting reached a climax on 13 May, when elements of the 5th Marines sought to regain contact with the elusive enemy they had tried to corner on the previous day. During the afternoon of the 13th, elements of the 3d Battalion, while sweeping the battlefield, came under intensive mortar and small arms fire from a well entrenched and cannily camouflaged enemy. Artillery and close air support were called in. When the enemy sought to flee the rain of steel and napalm, he was cut down by Marine riflemen.

During the night of 13-14 May, the enemy made a determined effort in a coordinated ground and mortar attack to push the Marines off the hill they were holding. Once more, the enemy was repulsed; under cover of darkness, he broke contact and withdrew in small groups. Enemy losses at the hands of the Marines in this operation numbered 865 killed.

In the course of UNION I, the 5th Marines had moved out of their positions in the Chu Lai area of responsibility. The 3d Battalion had moved to Tam Ky, while 1/5 began construction of a combat base deep in the Valley near the village of Que Son. The Que Son Valley was to become the scene of much of the 5th Marines action throughout the summer of 1967.

Operation UNION II followed soon after UNION I and was marked by heavy contact between the 5th Marines and members of the 2d NVA Division. The battle was fought among fortified hamlets on the floor of the valley. Once again, the NVA unit sustained heavy losses. About 700 of the enemy were killed before the remainder broke contact.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, was also active in the An Hoa

area to the west, aside from the activity in support of both UNION operations. In July, elements of 2/5 were hit by a well-coordinated night-ground and mortar attack at the Nong Son coal mine. After a furious assault, the enemy succeeded in penetrating the Marine defenses, but was again expelled. This action at Nong Son was followed by increased enemy probes of the remainder of the 2/5 positions near An Hoa.

Operations ADAIR, CALHOUN, and COCHISE did not result in any major engagement until 4 September. Shortly before dawn on that date, an estimated enemy battalion attacked the 1st Battalion. Reacting quickly, 5th Marine units were rushed to assist the embattled elements of 1/5. In a fierce battle that raged over much of the same terrain that had been covered during UNION I and II, contact with the enemy was maintained. Elements of all three of the 5th Marine battalions were committed to Operation SWIFT. Once again, the enemy was able to demonstrate his skill in camouflage and adapted his tactics to the surrounding terrain. The operation lasted until 17 September. Before it was over, the enemy tried various attacks and ambushes, but was repelled and suffered heavy casualties. Operation SWIFT came to an end when the enemy broke contact and filtered back into the mountains to reorganize his battered units, leaving behind 571 confirmed killed.

As summer came to a close, the 5th Marines were ordered north again on 30 September and were relieved by the 1st Air Cavalry Division in the Que Son Valley. The 1st and 3d Battalions moved into an area of responsibility just vacated by the 1st Marines south of Da Nang. There, it became the regiment's mission to protect the vital Da Nang area with the supplementary task of lending a hand in the Revolutionary Development Program.
(43)

NOTES

- (1) Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 342, hereafter Metcalf, USMC History.
- (2) Muster Rolls, Fifth Regiment, Jul13 (Diary Unit, Files Section, Records Branch, Personnel Department, HQMC), hereafter Muster Rolls with unit, month, and year until 16 Dec 1949, when the unit diary replaced the muster rolls. Commencing that date, specific reference to such documents will be cited, Unit Diary with unit, month, and year.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) CMC, Report...to the Secretary of the Navy, 1914 (Washington, 1914), p. 470, hereafter CMC, Report, with year.
- (5) Muster Rolls, Fifth Regiment, Dec14.
- (6) CMC, Report, 1915, p. 762.
- (7) President's ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dtd 27May17, (5th Regiment, Organization of (17May17-5Apr18) file, USMC, Box 11, Historical Branch World War I Collection, Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va.) hereafter USMC WWI Collection, with Box no., appropriate file, and document.
- (8) Secretary of War ltr to Secretary of the Navy, dtd 16May17, Subj: Organization and equipment of regiment of Marines for France, (USMC WWI Collection, Box 11, 5th Regiment, Organization of (17May17-5Apr18) file.
- (9) Muster Rolls, Fifth Regiment, May17.
- (10) Ibid.
- (11) Ibid., Jun17.
- (12) 5th Regiment, History of the Fifth Regiment, U. S. Marine Corps, 2d Division, American Expeditionary Forces in France, c. 1919 (Subj file, Units (Ground), 5th Regiment, Hist Branch, HQMC), p. 2, hereafter Fifth Regiment, History.
- (13) Ibid.

- (14) Maj Edwin N. McClellan, USMC, The United States Marine Corps in the World War (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 31, hereafter McClellan, Marines in the World War. General Pershing wrote General Barnett on 10 November 1917 explaining why Marines were assigned to this rear area duty. The 5th was an extra regiment in the division and "was not provided for in the way of transportation and fighting equipment in case the Division should be pushed to the front. When, therefore, service of the rear troops and military and provost guards were needed... it was the Marine Regiment that had to be scattered...." General Pershing also complimented the regiment for its high state of discipline and excellent soldierly appearance.
- (15) 5th Regiment War Diaries, Jul-Sep17 (USMC WWI Collection, Box 11, 5th Regiment War Diaries file, 2Jan17-9May18).
- (16) Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces memo for Operations Section and Coordination Section, Subj: Revocation of Orders, dtd 21Sep17 (USMC WWI Collection, Box 11, 5th Regiment, Organization of (17May17-5Apr18) file.
- (17) Infantry units in the division were the Third Brigade, composed of the 9th and 23d Infantry (Regiments) and the 5th Machine Gun Battalion, and the Fourth (Marine) Brigade, which included the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. BGen Doyen was the first division commander. He was followed by Army MajGens Omar Bundy and James G. Harbord, and Marine MajGen John A. Lejeune, who led the division through most of its gallant fighting. McClellan, Marines in the World War, p. 38.
- (18) Ibid.
- (19) Fifth Regiment, History, p. 5.
- (20) Ibid., p. 7.
- (21) McClellan, Marines in the World War, pp. 40-41.
- (22) Unless otherwise noted, the sources for the 5th Regiment's participation in the World War I battles and the occupation of Germany are: Fifth Regiment, History; Metcalf, USMC History; McClellan, Marines in the World War; American Battle Monuments Commission, 2d Division Summary of Operations in the World War (Washington, 1944); Historical

Committee, Second Division Association, The Second Division, American Expeditionary Force in France, 1917-1919 (New York: The Hillman Press, Inc., 1937).

- (23) Muster Rolls, Fifth Regiment, Jun18. On 11 June, Captain Williams was mortally wounded.
- (24) Material for the period between the 1920 reactivation of the regiment and its 1942 movement to New Zealand was derived from: Muster Rolls; CMC, Reports; Metcalf, USMC History; Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, The United States Marines in Nicaragua: Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No. 21 (Washington, rev. 1961).
- (25) Unless otherwise noted, material for the Guadalcanal campaign was derived from: Muster Rolls, 5th Marines, Jul-Dec42; LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal--vol. 1, History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1958); Maj John L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign (Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1949); Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The United States Marines in the Guadalcanal Campaign: Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No. 29 (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1961).
- (26) At this time, only two of the division's three infantry regiments were available. The 7th Marines had been detached in March for duty in Samoa. The 1st Marines arrived in Wellington on 11 July. It was partially due to this late arrival of the 1st that the date for the Guadalcanal landings was set back from 1 to 7 August.
- (27) Unless otherwise noted, material for the New Britain campaign was derived from: Muster Rolls, 5th Marines, Sep43-Apr44; LtCol Frank O. Hough and Maj John A. Crown, The Campaign on New Britain (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1952).
- (28) Infantry battalions, when reinforced with those combat service and support elements deemed necessary for an operation, were called landing teams. Infantry regiments similarly augmented were termed combat teams. Later, those

strengthened organizations were known by their abbreviated designations, BLT and RCT.

- (29) The 3d Battalion, designated Battalion Landing Team 35, arrived later in two echelons on 30 and 31 December. It first was the reserve for a division group commanded by the assistant division commander.
- (30) On 1 July 1943, responsibility for rendering monthly personnel reports had been changed from company to battalion level. This administration consolidation also facilitated the designation of the basic fighting organization by using arabic numerals for the battalion and regimental numbers. Thus, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was written simply as 2/5.
- (31) Unless otherwise noted, material for the regiment's stay at Pavuvu and subsequent operation on Peleliu was derived from: Muster Rolls, 5th Marines, May-Oct44; George McMillan, The Old Breed, A History of the First Marine Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949); Maj Frank O. Hough, The Assault on Peleliu (Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1950). George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, "Operations in the Western Pacific---History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II", vol. 4.
- (32) Following acquisition of the Palaus by League of Nations mandate in 1920, Japan permitted few visitors on the islands. For this reason, little was known about them. In addition, pre-assault photographic reconnaissance proved generally unsatisfactory. An interesting account of a Marine officer's visit to the Palaus can be found in LtCol Philip N. Pierce, "The Unsolved Mystery of Pete Ellis," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 46, no. 2 (Feb62), pp. 34-40.
- (33) On 17 September, the 81st Infantry Division assaulted Angaur, immediately south of Peleliu. Three days later, Angaur fell. On the 23d, one of the 81s Division's reinforced regiments, RCT 321, attached to the 1st Marine Division, came ashore on Peleliu. The following day, the 321st was engaging the enemy about halfway up the western side of that island.
- (34) Officially designated the Landing Vehicle Tracked (Armored) the LVT(A) is, essentially, a cargo or personnel type

amphibian tractor with a cannon mounted on top.

- (35) Unless otherwise noted, material on Pavuvu and the Okinawa campaign was derived from: Muster Rolls, 5th Marines, Nov44-Jun45; McMillan, The Old Breed, op. cit.; Maj Charles S. Nichols, Jr., and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1955).
- (36) Unless otherwise noted, material for the period between Okinawa and Korea was derived from: Muster Rolls, 5th Marines, Sep45-Feb50; Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The United States Marines in North China, 1945-1949: Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No. 23 (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1960); Henry I. Shaw, Jr., "North China Marines," to be published as Part V, v. V, History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II (MS, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps).
- (37) Unless otherwise noted, material concerning 5th Marines participation in Korea was derived from: Unit Diary, 5th Marines, Jun50-Mar55; 5th Marines Command Diaries, May52-Feb55 and the following volumes of the series, U. S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953; Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter, v. I, The Inchon-Seoul Operation, v. II, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, v. III, and Lynn Montross, Maj Hubbard D. Kuokka, and Maj Norman W. Hicks, The East-Central Front, v. IV (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1954-1962).
- (38) By 3 September 1950, the division, consisting mainly of its headquarters and the 1st Marines, had arrived in Japan. The third Marine infantry regiment in the division, the 7th Marines, was activated at Camp Pendleton on 17 August 1950 and was to arrive on 21 September at Inchon.
- (39) For a discussion of these details, refer to Montross and Canzona, The Inchon-Seoul Operation, op. cit. pp. 41-42, 59-60, 62-64.
- (40) Ascom City derived its name after the end of World War II (September 1945) when the Army Service Command took over an area which the Japanese had used as a logistical base. Later the facilities were turned over to the ROK Army. Major

Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962), p. 43n.

- (41) A similar situation occurred in the World War I fight at Soissons when snarled traffic caused the 5th Regiment to double-time in the last portion of its move to the line of departure.
- (42) The section of this history dealing with the period 1955-1965 was derived from: Unit Diary, 5th Marines, Jun55-Dec62; issues of The Pendleton Scout, Camp Pendleton, California, 1955-1965).
- (43) Material on operations of the 5th Marines in Vietnam to the end of 1967 was obtained from "A Brief History of the 5th Marines (June 1965-December 1967)," prepared by Headquarters, 5th Marines, 13Dec67.

APPENDIX A
COMMANDING OFFICERS, 5TH MARINES
1914 - 1962

5th Regiment U. S. Marine Corps

Col	Charles A. Doyen	25 Jul 1914 - 24 Dec 1914
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Note: On 24 December 1914, the regiment was disbanded at the Navy Yard, Philadelphia.

Col	Charles A. Doyen	7 Jun 1917 - 10 Jul 1917
Maj	Logan Feland	11 Jul 1917 - 16 Jul 1917
Col	Charles A. Doyen	17 Jul 1917 - 1 Aug 1917
LtCol	Logan Feland	2 Aug 1917 only (Acting)
Col	Charles A. Doyen	3 Aug 1917 - 23 Oct 1917
Maj	Frederic M. Wise	24 Oct 1917 - 29 Oct 1917
LtCol	Hiram I. Bearrs	30 Oct 1917 - 31 Dec 1917
Col	Wendell C. Neville	1 Jan 1918 - 7 Jul 1918
LtCol	Logan Feland	8 Jul 1918 - 25 Jul 1918
Col	Wendell C. Neville	26 Jul 1918 - 27 Jul 1918
Col	Logan Feland	28 Jul 1918 - 20 Mar 1919
Col	Harold C. Snyder	21 Mar 1919 - 13 Aug 1919

Note: On 13 August 1919, the 5th Regiment was disbanded at Quantico, Virginia.

Col	Frederic L. Bradman	8 Jul 1920 - 13 May 1922
LtCol	James K. Tracy	14 May 1922 - 24 Jul 1922
LtCol	Raymond B. Sullivan	25 Jul 1922 - 19 Sep 1922
LtCol	James K. Tracy	20 Sep 1922 - 2 Oct 1922
LtCol	Harold C. Snyder	3 Oct 1922 - 15 Mar 1924
LtCol	Edward A. Greene	16 Mar 1924 - 19 Apr 1924
Col	Harold C. Snyder	20 Apr 1924 - 27 Apr 1924
LtCol	Edward A. Greene	28 Apr 1924 - 22 May 1924
Col	John F. McGill	23 May 1924 - 31 May 1925
Col	Harry R. Lay	1 Jun 1925 - 13 Sep 1925
LtCol	Robert Y. Rhea	14 Sep 1925 - 12 Oct 1925
Col	Louis M. Gulick	13 Oct 1925 - 29 Mar 1926
LtCol	Robert Y. Rhea	30 Mar 1926 - 29 Apr 1926
Col	Louis M. Gulick	30 Apr 1926 - 19 Feb 1927
LtCol	Robert Y. Rhea	20 Feb 1927 - 31 Mar 1927
Col	Louis M. Gulick	1 Apr 1927 - 30 Jan 1928

LtCol	Benjamin S. Berry
Col	Rush R. Wallace
LtCol	Lauren S. Willis
Col	Theodore E. Backstrom
LtCol	James T. Buttrick
Col	James T. Buttrick
LtCol	Franklin B. Garrett
Maj	Anderson C. Dearing
LtCol	Franklin B. Garrett
LtCol	Edward W. Sturdevant
Maj	Anderson C. Dearing
LtCol	Lauren S. Willis
Maj	Frederick R. Hoyt

31	Jan 1928	-	25 Feb 1928
26	Feb 1928	-	16 Apr 1929
17	Apr 1929	-	30 Apr 1929
	1 May 1929	-	4 Sep 1929
	5 Sep 1929	-	12 Dec 1929
	13 Dec 1929	-	11 Apr 1930
	12 Apr 1930	-	2 Jul 1931
	3 Jul 1931	-	12 Jul 1931
	13 Jul 1931	-	7 Sep 1931
	8 Sep 1931	-	15 Nov 1931
	16 Nov 1931	-	3 Feb 1932
	4 Feb 1932	-	14 Nov 1932
	15 Nov 1932	-	2 Jan 1933

Note: On 2 January 1933, the 5th Marines was disbanded in Nicaragua.

LtCol	Charles F. B. Price
Col	Harold L. Parsons
LtCol	Matthew H. Kingman
Col	Harold L. Parsons
LtCol	Matthew H. Kingman
LtCol	Walter G. Sheard
Col	Charles J. Miller
LtCol	Walter G. Sheard
Col	Charles J. Miller
	None designated
Col	Samuel M. Harrington
LtCol	Henry L. Larsen
Col	Samuel M. Harrington
LtCol	Henry L. Larsen
Col	Samuel M. Harrington
LtCol	Allen H. Turnage
Col	Julian C. Smith
LtCol	William T. Clement
LtCol	David L. S. Brewster
Col	Charles D. Barrett
LtCol	David L. S. Brewster
Col	David L. S. Brewster
LtCol	Alfred H. Noble
Col	Alfred H. Noble
LtCol	Graves B. Erskine
Col	Alfred H. Noble
LtCol	Charles T. Brooks
LtCol	Robert C. J. Kilmartin
LtCol	Charles T. Brooks

1	Sep 1934	-	31 Aug 1935
1	Sep 1935	-	24 Sep 1935
25	Sep 1935	-	4 Oct 1935
	5 Oct 1935	-	22 Mar 1936
	23 Mar 1936	-	31 May 1936
	1 Jun 1936	-	30 Jun 1936
	1 Jul 1936	-	2 Aug 1936
	3 Aug 1936	-	16 Aug 1936
	17 Aug 1936	-	23 May 1937
	24 May 1937	only	
	25 May 1937	-	20 Oct 1937
	21 Oct 1937	-	27 Oct 1937
	28 Oct 1937	-	31 Oct 1937
	1 Nov 1937	-	10 Nov 1937
	11 Nov 1937	-	25 Jun 1938
	26 Jun 1938	-	30 Jun 1938
	1 Jul 1938	-	11 Jul 1939
	12 Jul 1939	-	29 Jul 1939
	30 Jul 1939	-	3 Aug 1939
	4 Aug 1939	-	3 May 1940
	4 May 1940	-	24 May 1940
	25 May 1940	-	26 May 1940
	27 May 1940	-	2 Sep 1940
	3 Sep 1940	-	6 Nov 1940
	7 Nov 1940	-	10 Nov 1940
	11 Nov 1940	-	28 Mar 1941
	29 Mar 1941	-	13 Apr 1941
	14 Apr 1941	-	13 May 1941
	14 May 1941	-	26 May 1941

Col	Robert Blake	27 May 1941 - 28 Dec 1941
LtCol	Charles T. Brooks	29 Dec 1941 - 31 Dec 1941
Col	Robert Blake	1 Jan 1942 - 8 Apr 1942
Col	Leroy P. Hunt	9 Apr 1942 - 19 Sep 1942
Col	Merritt A. Edson	20 Sep 1942 - 28 Jul 1943
Col	John T. Selden	29 Jul 1943 - 29 Feb 1944
Col	Oliver P. Smith	1 Mar 1944 - 9 Apr 1944
LtCol	Henry W. Buse, Jr.	10 Apr 1944 - 20 May 1944
Col	William S. Fellers	20 May 1944 - 17 Aug 1944
Col	Harold D. Harris	18 Aug 1944 - 28 Sep 1944
Col	John H. Griebel	29 Sep 1944 - 23 Jun 1945
Col	Julian N. Frisbie	25 Jun 1945 - 15 Oct 1945
Col	Robert E. Hill	16 Oct 1945 - 8 Nov 1945
Col	Theodore A. Holdahl	9 Nov 1945 - 13 Mar 1946
Col	None designated	14 Mar 1946 only
LtCol	August Larson	15 Mar 1946 - 15 Jul 1946
Col	Julian N. Frisbie	16 Jul 1946 - 31 May 1947

Note: On 1 June 1947, the 5th Marines, as a part of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade formed that date, had no regimental commander designated, but rather became a two battalion organization, until 1 October 1947, when the next regimental commander was named.

1st Battalion

LtCol Theodore M. Sheffield
1 Jun 1947 - 30 Sep 1947

LtCol	Theodore M. Sheffield
Col	Ernest W. Fry, Jr.
Col	Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr.
Col	Victor H. Krulak
LtCol	Raymond L. Murray
Col	Raymond L. Murray
Col	Richard W. Hayward
Col	Richard G. Weede
Col	Frank P. Hager, Jr.
Col	Thomas A. Culhane, Jr.
Col	Eustace R. Smoak
Col	Lewis W. Walt
Col	Harvey C. Tschirgi
Col	Rathvon McC. Tompkins
Col	Elby D. Martin
Col	Hamilton M. Hoyler
Col	Robert H. Ruud

2d Battalion

LtCol Ralph A. Collins, Jr.
1 Oct 1947 - 31 Mar 1948

1 Apr 1948 - 31 Aug 1949
1 Sep 1949 - 30 Sep 1949
1 Oct 1949 - 9 Jun 1950
10 Jun 1950 - 23 Jan 1951
24 Jan 1951 - 13 Mar 1951
14 Mar 1951 - 6 Aug 1951
7 Aug 1951 - 18 Nov 1951
19 Nov 1951 - 22 Feb 1952
23 Feb 1952 - 15 Aug 1952
16 Aug 1952 - 9 Dec 1952
10 Dec 1952 - 13 Apr 1953
14 Apr 1953 - 1 Aug 1953
2 Aug 1953 - 1 Feb 1954
2 Feb 1954 - 18 Jul 1954
19 Jul 1954 - 30 Nov 1954
1 Dec 1954 - 25 Jun 1955

LtCol	Crawford B. Lawton	26 Jun 1955 - 31 Jul 1955
Col	James S. Blais	1 Aug 1955 - 31 Aug 1956
Col	Richard Rothwell	1 Sep 1956 - 14 Jun 1957
LtCol	David A. Van Evera	15 Jun 1957 - 9 Jul 1957
Col	Bruce T. Hemphill	10 Jul 1957 - 10 Dec 1957
Col	Donald Schmuck	11 Dec 1957 - 5 Mar 1958
Col	Tolson A. Smoak	6 Mar 1959 - 8 Mar 1960
Col	Webb D. Sawyer	9 Apr 1960 - 12 Jul 1961
Col	Charles E. Warren	13 Jul 1961 - 15 Feb 1962
Col	James T. Kisgen	16 Feb 1962 - 8 Aug 1962
Col	Homer E. Hire	9 Aug 1962 - 17 Jul 1963
Col	Walter E. Reynolds	18 Jul 1963 - 28 Jul 1964
Col	Victor J. Croizat	29 Jul 1964 - 15 Aug 1965
Col	Charles F. Widdecke	16 Aug 1965 - 26 Dec 1966
Col	Fred E. Haynes, Jr.	27 Dec 1966 - 1 Jul 1967
Col	Stanley Davis	2 Jul 1967 -

APPENDIX B

5TH MARINES MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS

# LCdr	Alexander G. Lyle	23 Apr 1918	Toulon-Troyon Sector, France
%& Sgt	Ernest A. Janson	6 Jun 1918	Chateau-Thierry, France
# Lt(jg)	Weedon E. Osborne	6 Jun 1918	Bouresches, France
# Lt	Orlando H. Petty	11 Jun 1918	Bois de Belleau, France
& Sgt	Louis Cukela	18 Jul 1918	Villers-Cotterets, France
& Sgt	Matej Kocak	18 Jul 1918	Villers-Cotterets, France
* Cpl	Lewis K. Bausell	15 Sep 1944	Peleliu, Palau Group
1stLt	Carlton R. Rouh	15 Sep 1944	Peleliu, Palau Group
# HA1	Robert E. Bush	2 May 1945	Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands
* PFC	Albert E. Schwab	7 May 1945	Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands
#* PM2	William D. Halyburton, Jr.	19 May 1945	Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands
* 1stLt	Baldomero Lopez	15 Sep 1950	Inchon, Korea
* PFC	Eugene A. Obregon	26 Sep 1950	Seoul, Korea
* SSgt	William G. Windrich	1 Dec 1950	Yudam-ni, Korea
* PFC	Whitt L. Moreland	29 May 1951	Kwagch'i-dong, Korea
* Cpl	Jack A. Davenport	21 Sep 1951	Songnae-dong, Korea

Cpl	Duane E. Dewey	16 Apr 1952	Panmunjom, Korea
PFC	Robert E. Simanek	17 Aug 1952	Pinil, Korea
PFC	Alford L. McLaughlin	5 Sep 1952	Sojong, Korea
* PFC	Fernando L. Garcia	5 Sep 1952	Un'gok, Korea
2dLt	Raymond G. Murphy	3 Feb 1953	Un'gok, Korea
#* HN <i>Sgt</i> Notes:	Francis C. Hammond <i>RICHARD A. PITTMAN</i>	27 Mar 1953 24 July 1966	Sanae-dong, Korea DMZ, RVN

- U. S. Navy

% - Served under the name of Charles Hoffman also

& - Received the Army Medal of Honor also

* - Awarded posthumously

APPENDIX C
HONORS OF THE 5TH MARINES

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATIONS

Solomon Islands Campaign	7 Aug - 9 Dec 1942
Peleliu and Ngesebus Campaigns	15 - 29 Sep 1944
Okinawa Campaign	1 Apr - 21 Jun 1945
Korea	7 Aug - 7 Sep 1950
Korea	15 Sep - 11 Oct 1950
Korea	27 Nov - 11 Dec 1950
Korea	21 - 26 Apr 1951
	16 May - 30 Jun 1951
	11 - 25 Sep 1951

NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION

Korea	11 Aug 1952 - 5 May 1953
	7 - 27 Jul 1953

EXPEDITIONARY STREAMER

Haiti	1914
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VICTORY STREAMER WORLD WAR I

Aisne Operation	1 - 5 Jun 1918
Aisne-Marne Operation	18 - 20 Jul 1918
St. Mihiel Operation	12 - 16 Sep 1918
Meuse- Argonne Operation	29 Sep - 10 Oct 1918
	21 - 22 Oct 1918
	25 Oct - 11 Nov 1918

Defense-Sector Operation	
Toulon-Troyon Sector	18 Mar - 13 May 1918
Chateau-Thierry Sector	6 Jun - 16 Jul 1918
Marbache Sector	6 - 16 Aug 1918
Limey Sector	10 - 11 Sep 1918

ARMY OF OCCUPATION OF GERMANY STREAMER

12 Nov 1918 - 21 Jul 1919

SECOND NICARAGUAN CAMPAIGN STREAMER

27 Aug 1926 - 2 Jan 1933

AMERICAN DEFENSE SERVICE STREAMER
(with one Bronze Star)
1941

ASIATIC-PACIFIC CAMPAIGN STREAMER

Guadalcanal-Tulagi Landings	7 - 9 Aug 1942
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal	10 Aug - 9 Dec 1942
Eastern New Guinea Operation	
Finschhafen Occupation	8 Oct - 25 Dec 1943
Bismarck Archipelago Operation	
Cape Gloucester, New Britain	26 Dec 1943 - 1 Mar 1944
Supporting and Consolidating Operations	5 Mar - 25 Apr 1944
Western Caroline Islands Operation	
Capture and Occupation of Southern Palau Islands	15 Sep - 14 Oct 1944
Okinawa Gunto Operation	
Assault and Occupation of Okinawa Gunto	1 Apr - 30 Jun 1945

VICTORY STREAMER WORLD WAR II

7 Dec 1941 - 31 Dec 1946

NAVY OCCUPATION SERVICE STREAMER WITH ASIA CLASP

2 - 26 Sep 1945

CHINA SERVICE STREAMER

30 Sep 1945 - 25 May 1947

NATIONAL DEFENSE SERVICE STREAMER WITH ONE BRONZE STAR

27 Jun 1950 - 27 Jul 1954

31 Dec 1960 - present

KOREAN SERVICE STREAMER

North Korean Aggression	2 Aug - 2 Nov 1950
Inchon Landing	13 - 17 Sep 1950
Communist China Aggression	3 Nov 1950 - 24 Jan 1951
First United Nations Counteroffensive	25 Jan - 21 Apr 1951
Communist China Spring Offensive	22 Apr - 8 Jul 1951
United Nations Summer-Fall Offensive	9 Jul - 27 Nov 1951
Second Korean Winter	28 Nov 1951 - 30 Apr 1952
Korean Defense, Summer-Fall, 1952	1 May - 30 Nov 1952
Third Korean Winter	1 Dec 1952 - 30 Apr 1953
Korea, Summer-Fall, 1953	1 May - 27 Jul 1953

FRENCH CROIX DE GUERRE STREAMER
(with two Palms and one Gilt Star)

Belleau Wood	2 - 13 Jun 1918
Soissons	18 - 19 Jul 1918
Champagne	1 - 10 Oct 1918

KOREAN PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

Korean Campaign	2 Aug - 6 Sep 1950
Korean Campaign	15 - 27 Sep 1950
Korean Campaign	26 Oct 1950 - 27 Jul 1953

VIETNAM

VIETNAMESE SERVICE STREAMER WITH TWO BRONZE STARS

Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign	27 Feb - 30 Jun 1966
No name established campaign	1 Jul 1966 -

